

Dossier Consejo de Seguridad Historico -
Republica Arabe Unida - Crisis Misiles Cubanos

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Chapter 1

Comité - CS

1.1 Documentos

Propuesta Cuba consulta CIJ

1. Was the OAS, under the terms of its Charter, a regional agency within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (having to do with regional arrangements), and did its activities have to be compatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations?
2. Under the United Nations Charter, did the OAS have the right, as a regional agency, to take the enforcement action provided for in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter without the authorization of the Security Council?
3. Could the expression "enforcement action" in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter be considered to include the measures provided for in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter? Was the list of those measures in Article 41 exhaustive?
4. Did the OAS Charter provide for any procedure for expelling a State member of the organization, in particular because of its social system?
5. Could the provisions of the OAS Charter and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance be considered to take precedence over the obligations of Member States under the United Nations Charter?
6. Was one of the main principles of the United Nations Charter that membership in the Organization was open to States which met the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter, irrespective of their system?
7. In the light of the replies to the foregoing questions, were, or were not, the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este relating to the expulsion of a State member of a regional agency because of its social system and the taking of other enforcement action against it, without the authorization of the Security Council, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, the OAS Charter and the Treaty of Rio?

Resolucion OEA 23 Octubre

1. called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;
2. recommended that the members of the OAS, in accordance with articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, to ensure that the Cuban Government could not continue to receive military material from the Sino-Soviet Powers, which threatened the peace and security of the hemisphere, and to prevent the offensive missiles in Cuba from becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent;
3. expressed the hope that the Security Council would, in accordance with the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba as soon as possible; and
4. requested OAS members to keep the organization informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph 2 (above).

Puntos de Castro

1. cessation of the economic blockade and of all the measures of commercial and economic pressure being carried out by the United States against Cuba;
2. cessation of all subversive activities, including the dropping and landing of weapons by air and sea, the organization of invasions by mercenaries and the infiltration of spies and saboteurs;
3. cessation of "piratical" attacks carried out from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico; cessation of violations of Cuban airspace and territorial waters by United States aircraft and warships;
4. withdrawal of the United States from its military base at Guantanamo

Propuesta RAU y Ghana 24 Oct

1. request the Acting Secretary-General to confer promptly with the parties directly concerned on the immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;
2. call upon the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution and provide every assistance to the Acting Secretary-General in performing his task
3. request the Acting Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraph 1 (above) ;
4. call upon the parties concerned to refrain meanwhile from any action which might directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation

Artículo 4

1. Podrán ser Miembros de las Naciones Unidas todos los demás Estados amantes de la paz que acepten las obligaciones consignadas en esta Carta, y que, a juicio de la Organización, estén capacitados para cumplir dichas obligaciones y se hallen dispuestos a hacerlo.
2. La admisión de tales Estados como Miembros de las Naciones Unidas se efectuará por decisión de la Asamblea General a recomendación del Consejo de Seguridad.

Artículo 41 El Consejo de Seguridad podrá decidir qué medidas que no impliquen el uso de la fuerza armada han de emplearse para hacer efectivas sus decisiones, y podrá instar a los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas a que apliquen dichas medidas, que podrán comprender la interrupción total o parcial de las relaciones económicas y de las comunicaciones ferroviarias, marítimas, aéreas, postales, telegráficas, radioeléctricas, y otros medios de comunicación, así como la ruptura de relaciones diplomáticas.

Artículo 52

1. Ninguna disposición de esta Carta se opone a la existencia de acuerdos u organismos regionales cuyo fin sea entender en los asuntos relativos al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales y susceptibles de acción regional, siempre que dichos acuerdos u organismos, y sus actividades, sean compatibles con los Propósitos y Principios de las Naciones Unidas.
2. Los Miembros de las Naciones Unidas que sean partes en dichos acuerdos o que constituyan dichos organismos, harán todos los esfuerzos posibles para lograr el arreglo pacífico de las controversias de carácter local por medio de tales acuerdos u organismos regionales antes de someterlas al Consejo de Seguridad.
3. El Consejo de Seguridad promoverá el desarrollo del arreglo pacífico de las controversias de carácter local por medio de dichos acuerdos u organismos regionales, procediendo, bien a iniciativa de los Estados interesados, bien a instancia del Consejo de Seguridad.
4. Este Artículo no afecta en manera alguna la aplicación de los Artículos 34 y 35.

Artículo 53

1. El Consejo de Seguridad utilizará dichos acuerdos u organismos regionales, si a ello hubiere lugar, para aplicar medidas coercitivas bajo su autoridad. Sin embargo, no se aplicarán medidas coercitivas en virtud de acuerdos regionales o por organismos regionales sin autorización del Consejo de Seguridad, salvo que contra Estados enemigos, según se les define en el párrafo 2 de este Artículo, se tomen las medidas dispuestas en virtud del Artículo 107 o en acuerdos regionales dirigidos contra la renovación de una política de agresión de parte de dichos Estados, hasta tanto que a solicitud

de los gobiernos interesados quede a cargo de la Organización la responsabilidad de prevenir nuevas agresiones de parte de aquellos Estados.

2. El término "Estados enemigos" empleado en el párrafo 1 de este Artículo se aplica a todo Estado que durante la segunda guerra mundial haya sido enemigo de cualquiera de los signatarios de esta Carta

1.1.1 Reglamento provisional

Presidente El presidente es la Unión Soviética. El artículo 20 del reglamento provisional del consejo dice que cuando el presidente del Consejo esta envuelto en una situación que envuelve al país que el representa e imposibilita el rol de la presidencia el podrá ceder la presidencia al siguiente miembro en el orden, el presidente solo deberá comunicar la decisión, En este caso la República Árabe Unida. Sería una buena manera de conducir una negociación entre URSS Cuba y EEUU.

Apelación En el artículo 30 dice que cuando se usa un punto de orden y la mesa después de emitir su decisión esta es cuestionada, la mesa consultará su decisión con el consejo.

Reunión Cerrada El artículo 48 habla de que si el Consejo quiere se puede reunir en privado y que por defecto todas las reuniones son públicas

1.2 Repertoire

1.2.1 Capitulo VI

Artículo 33 - mecanismos Algunas Condiciones afectan la aplicabilidad del artículo, como son la indisposición, un prominente fracaso, un recurso inadecuado o la presencia de una amenaza peor o una controversia mas fuerte. Se debe buscar una manera de sobrellevar este problema. Otro aspecto de una controversia es quien propone su discusión y bajo que condiciones, y que si bien el Consejo debe promover la resolución sobre organismos regionales adecuados debe tener una actitud conciliatoria y esperar al final para hacer su pronunciamiento final.

Artículo 34 y 35- Investigación y consideración En este caso se propone que las controversias que puedan poner en peligro a la paz y seguridad internacional si persisten podrán ser investigadas por el Consejo y de igual manera todos los miembros podrán remitir una cuestión a discusión del Consejo, y se discutía que el hecho de que fuese discutido por un órgano regional no imposibilitaba a ser discutido por el Consejo (pagina 5). sobre todo en el caso Cubano donde en la regional no se estaba considerando una parte.

1.2.2 Capitulo VII

Artículo 39 Bajo el precepto de la destrucción mutua una invasión o un hecho que llevara a consideración de este artículo puede tener consecuencias

devastadoras. Para evitar que una situación fuese considerada una amenaza el uso del artículo 40 y sus medidas provisionales proveen un mecanismo provisional para evitar escalamiento de conflicto, como por ejemplo la suspensión de una decisión previa.

Chapter 2

Tema

2.1 Incidentes recientes

1. Situación U2, en espacio soviético y Cumbre de París(1960): Un U2 estadounidense sobrevoló espacio aéreo soviético y fue derribado y después denunciado por la Unión Soviética cuando entró a su espacio aéreo para espiar. Este incidente frustró el intento de negociación de París en el mes de mayo de 1960, sin embargo al final la URSS pierde la contienda en una votación del CS (S/RES/135).
2. Embargo de Estados Unidos a Cuba:
3. Bahía de Cochinos (Abril de 1961):
4. Proclama de gobierno socialista y alianza con URSS por parte de Cuba
5. Salida de Cuba de la OEA (Enero 1962)
6. Cumbre de Ginebra: en esta cumbre se pudo crear un clima más acorde para negociar y solucionar ciertos problemas. Por ejemplo Eisenhower propuso a los *Cielos Abiertos* para poder contrarrestar la carrera armamentista y misilística en el planeta. Por otro lado la URSS consideró una Alemania unificada y neutral pero cuando la Alemania Federal se unió a la OTAN, la Alemania Democrática estaba en el Pacto de Varsovia y los soviéticos propusieron una salida de ambas organizaciones y una disolución tanto de la OTAN como del Pacto para sustituirla por una organización de seguridad colectiva distinta.

2.2 Línea de tiempo - 1962

1. 31 ENE - Expulsión Cuba
2. 22 FEB - Cuba se queja por las acciones tomadas contra ella y envía una carta al CS
3. 27 FEB - Se rechaza la propuesta de agenda de Cuba en el Consejo

4. 08 MAR - Cuba propone al Consejo mediante un borrador de resolución Pedir una consulta a la CIJ
5. 19 MAR - Cuba en una discusión propone un draft donde pide una consulta a la CIJ
6. 23 MAR - Se vota y se rechaza la propuesta cubana 3
7. 14 OCT - U2 sobrevuela Cuba y divisa los misiles
8. 15 OCT - Analisis de las fotos y notificación. Incremento de actividades insurgentes en Cuba de parte de EEUU
9. 16 OCT - Conformación del EXCOMM, debate sobre operabilidad de los misiles, se evalúan estrategias de respuesta. URSS dice que su actividad en Cuba es defensiva. *Inicio del comité*
10. 17 OCT - Se proponen ideas de negociación y el embajador soviético en EEUU notifica que lo que hay en Cuba es totalmente defensivo
11. 18 OCT - Reunión entre URSS y EEUU en la Casa Blanca (Gromyko). Se comunica al EXCOMM que los misiles solo necesitan 18 para funcionar. URSS en la reunión argumenta que el abuso estadounidense a Cuba es la razón de la presencia soviética que busca defender y apoyar a Cuba.
12. 19 OCT - Se consideran los aspectos diplomáticos y militares para imponer el bloqueo.
13. 20 OCT - Se prepara un posible bloqueo aunque se empieza a divisar la posibilidad de una cuarentena y se propone por primera vez el desmantelamiento de Turquía y el retiro de Guantanamo pero se rechaza. Se divisan ojivas nucleares
14. 21 OCT - Se consolida el sentimiento de acción y que se toma con más apoyo es la del la cuarentena
15. 22 OCT - Discurso a la Nación por Kennedy explicando los días a seguir. DEFCON 3
16. 23 OCT - OEA acuerda de manera unánime la cuarentena a Cuba mediante el TIAR, Cuba y la URSS responden alegando que las acciones tomadas son un acto de agresión y que Cuba no se desarmará. Naves de EEUU en posición. La URSS comunica entre otras cosas la grave presencia de una amenaza a la paz y seguridad de los pueblos. La línea de cuarentena se reduce 500 millas. Reunión en el Consejo donde la URSS propone la condena del bloqueo y niega los misiles. Se solicita reunión urgente por Cuba, EEUU y URSS. Se habla en el consejo de la Cuarentena
17. 24 OCT - DEFCON 2. URSS propone cumbre con EEUU y reitera que el bloqueo es agresión. Carta de U Thant donde pide suspensión de ambas actividades entre 2 y 3 semanas. República Árabe Unida y Ghana presentan draft 4

18. 25 OCT - Discusión en el Consejo de Seguridad. *punto maximo* Intercepcion de nave soviética por naves estadounidenses de la cuarentena, la dejan pasar porque no llevaba nada, se eleva la tensión a nivel internacional cuando se autoriza que las naves del Comando Aliado Supremo lleven ojivas. el EXCOMM considera hacer intercambio de la base en Turquía por esta en Cuba. Se contesta la Carta de U Thant y ambos evaden el tema de hacer aunque acepten la necesidad, URSS es mas abierta a esa opción. el Secretario General Interino propone a las partes uno que suspenda la cuarentena, al otro que suspenda el envío y al otro el montaje para poder dar una negociación efectiva. suspensión sine die Propuesta por la RAU y Ghana.
19. 26 OCT - EEUU envía a Cuba mediante Brasil una carta asegurando que no invadirá Cuba, esta última no lo considera real. El bloqueo se estanca. se empieza a organizar una posible invasión. Los misiles siguen armandose. Las partes aceptan la propuesta del SG.
20. 27 OCT - Muerte de un piloto estadounidense de un U2 y las negociaciones casi se caen. EEUU sigue negociando y e indica que no invade Cuba a cambio de los misiles en Cuba y Turquía quedaba para despues. Otro U2 casi es interceptado por soviéticos en la frontera con Alaska. Una carta soviética llega a EEUU donde se dice que propone un intercambio publico entre turquia por cuba.
21. 28 OCT - Aceptación y desmantelamiento de las bases en Cuba.

2.3 Relato de las Sesiones

2.3.1 CUBA'S COMPLAINT OF 22 FEBRUARY 1962

Cuba: "Cuba asked that an immediate meeting of the Security Council be called to consider its complaint that the US had promoted the adoption of enforcement action against Cuba at the meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. . ."

Cuba: ". . . those measures had been implemented without the authorization of the SC, in violation of Article 53 of the UN Charter."

USSR and Cuba: "Other representatives favored the adoption of the agenda on the ground that the present Cuban complaint was different from the one which the General Assembly had considered Romania and the USSR further observed, among other things that the meeting at Punta del Este had taken place subsequent to the submission of the complaint by Cuba to the General Assembly and that the OAS decision constituted enforcement action which required authorization by the SC."

USSR: "The USSR representative, among other, maintained that under the Council's provisional rules of procedure Cuba could participate in the consideration of the question as well as in the discussion on the adoption of the agenda, and he moved that the question be put to the vote." Cuba: "Cuba said it had been deprived of its right, under the UN Charter, to bring before the Council a situation which created a serious threat to peace. Cuba considered it an infringement of the Council's authority, and a dangerous precedent, that a group

of Member State could prevent consideration of a matter which was clearly within the Council's competence."

2.3.2 CUBA'S REQUEST OF 8 MARCH 1962

Cuba: "On 19 March, the representative of Cuba, who had been invited to participate in the discussion, submitted a draft resolution by which the SC would decide to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion,(pagina 3). In the light of the replies to the foregoing questions, were, or were not, the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este relating to the expulsion of a State member of a regional agency because of its social system and the taking of other enforcement action against it, without the authorization of the SC, consistent with the provisions of the UN Charter, the OAS charter and the Treaty of Rio?

US: "The US representative maintained that the Cuban complaint sought to extend the Soviet veto to all regional organizations by way of the SC. None of the resolutions adopted at the Punta del Este meeting contravened the UN Charter or required SC authorization. The exclusion of the present Cuban regime from the OAS was a defensive reaction to Cuba's subversive activities against the free institutions and security of the America's. He went on to say that the OAS, as an agency for collective defence for the hemisphere, within the meaning of Article 52 of the UN Charter -(having to do with regional arrangements), ought to be able to determine who should participate in its proceedings without being subjected to a veto in the SC, for otherwise the independence and effectiveness of regional organizations would be wholly destroyed. The exclusion of the present Cuban regime from the OAS had been not because of its social system but for its violations of the OAS Charter. Moreover, no "enforcement action" within the meaning of Article 53 of the Charter was involved in the suspension of trade in arms with Cuba. It was a step that any state could legally take, independently or collectively, without authorization from anyone. In his view, he concluded, there was no question which merited submission to the International Court of Justice."

USSR: "The USSR representative, in supporting the Cuban request, declared that the Punta del Este decisions were aimed at changing the social structure of Cuba; the use of a regional agency for aggressive purposes was contrary to the provisions of the OAS Charter, as well as of the UN Charter, and represented a new danger to peace. Enforcement measures had been taken by the OAS against Cuba despite the fact that that organization was not empowered to do so without special authorization from the SC." United Arab Republic: "Support for the Cuban draft resolution was also expressed by the United Arab Republic and Ghana. In the latter's view, there was reasonable legal doubt as to the interpretation of the term "enforcement action" within the meaning of Article 53." USSR: " On 23 March, the USSR representative asked that the Cuban draft resolution be put to the vote. This was in accordance with rule 38 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, by which proposals may be submitted by non-member invited to participate in the Council's deliberations on a particular matter, but by which such proposals can be put to the vote only at the request of a Council member."

2.3.3 COUNCIL MEETINGS, 23-25 OCTOBER 1962

October 23, US: "The US asked the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world which had been caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the USSR of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America. . . . were far in excess of any conceivable defence requirements of Cuba. The US also submitted as draft resolution by which the SC would among other things: 1. Call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, 2. Authorize and request the UN Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a UN observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution, 3. Call for the termination of measures of quarantine directed against military shipments to Cuba upon UN certification of compliance with paragraph 1 (above) and 4. Urgently recommend that the US and USSR confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world and report thereon to the SC."

Cuba: "The Cuban letter asked the Council to consider urgently "the act of war unilaterally committed by the Government of the US in ordering the naval blockade of Cuba." It added that the US action was in disregard of the international organizations, particularly of the SC, and was creating an imminent danger of war."

USSR: "The USSR letter asked the Council to examine the question of "Violation of the Charter of the UN and threat to the peace on the part of the US." An attached statement asserted that the US was taking a step towards the unleashing of a world thermo-nuclear war and was violating international law and the principles of the UN Charter by assuming the right to commit "piracy" on the high seas. The USSR regarded it as its duty to warn the US that, in carrying out the measures announced, it was taking on itself "a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world, and recklessly playing with fire." Soviet assistance to Cuba, on the other hand, was designed exclusively to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and was made necessary by the continuous threats and acts of provocation of the US. The USSR wished to emphasize once again that all its weapons would continue to serve the purpose of defense against aggressors."

US: The US representative declared that the transformation of Cuba into a base for offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction constituted a threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere and to the peace of the world. Nothing that some had sought to equate the Soviet bases in Cuba with those of NATO in parts of the world near the USSR, he pointed out that missiles which introduced a nuclear threat into an area hitherto free of it, which were clandestinely installed and which resulted in the most formidable nuclear base in the world outside existing treaties had a different purpose from those which had been established in Europe years ago. He informed the Council that the OAS had that afternoon adopted a resolution calling among other things for the immediate withdrawal of all missiles from Cuba and recommending to OAS members that they take all measures, individually or collectively including the use of armed force, to prevent the receipt by Cuba of further military material."

Cuba: "The Cuban representative stated that the threat of war by American imperialism hung heavily over Cuba. Cuba had been forced to arm in order to defend itself against the repeated aggressions of the US. It had not only suffered

from the economic boycott and the hemisphere but had been the object of armed attacks and sabotage by agents trained in the US. The US, which had accused Cuba of being a threatening base, held the only foreign base in Cuba, at Guantanamo, against the Cuban people's will. Obviously, he said, the US had reserved for itself the right to decide which bases and rockets were good and which were bad and was pushing the world to the brink of war. Emphasizing that his Government would not accept any observers in matters within its domestic jurisdiction. . . .”

URSS: “The USSR representative declared that the US appeal to the SC was only an attempt to cover up its aggressive actions against Cuba. After declaring that the Soviet Government had not, and was not, directing any offensive armaments to Cuba, and after quoting from Official USSR statements to that effect, the USSR representative said that the US delegation was using fabrications for “horrendous” purposes in an attempt to compel the SC to approve retroactively the illegal aggressive measures taken by the US- What he termed the naval blockade of Cuba, imposed without a declaration of war The SC, he said, would be failing if it were to ignore those aggressive actions. The USSR delegation then submitted a draft resolution by which the Council would: 1. Condemn the actions of the US Government aimed at violating the UN Charter and increasing the threat of war, 2. Insist that the US Government revoke its decision to inspect ships of others States going to Cuba, 3. Propose to the US that it cease any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Cuba and other States which created a threat to peace and 4. Call upon the US, Cuba and the USSR to establish contact and enter into negotiations for the purpose of restoring the situation to normal and thus of removing the threat of an outbreak of war.”

United Arab Republic: “On 24 October, a joint draft resolution was submitted by Ghana and the UAR public by which the SC would: 1. Request the acting SG to confer promptly with the parties directly concerned on the immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing treat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean, 2. Call upon the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution and provide every assistance to the Acting SG in performing his task, 3. Request the Acting SG to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraph 1 (above), and 4. Call upon the parties concerned to refrain meanwhile from any action which might directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation. The representative of the UAR, emphasizing its country's advocacy of the principle of non-intervention and self-determination, declared that the imposition of a quarantine in the Caribbean was not only contrary to international law and the accepted norms of freedom of navigation but would lead to a heightening of world tensions and threatened international peace and security. The action had been taken without the authority of the SC, which had primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Ghana held that any attempt to attribute and offensive character to military arrangements, such as those adapted in Cuba, must be supported by conclusive proof.”

SG: “the Acting SG, U Thant, informed the SC that, at the request of a large number of member states, he had sent identical messages to the President of the US and to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba and, also, the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba. He

believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two or three weeks would give time to the parties to meet and discuss with a view to finding a peaceful solution of the problem. ..Appealed to the Cuban Government to suspend the construction and development of military facilities and installations during the period of those negotiations.”

US: On 25 October, the solution lay in the removal of those weapons. ..Said that his Government had had to act promptly because of the manner and speed with which nuclear missiles had been installed in Cuba; a delay would have meant the nuclearization of Cuba, a risk which the hemisphere was not prepared to take. He showed aerial reconnaissance photographs of the missile bases which he said afforded incontrovertible proof of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba. In addition to the missiles, he said, the USSR had sent a number of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which were in the process of being assembled, and had sent a large number of military personnel to Cuba.”

UAR: “The representatives of the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Chile welcomed the favorable response from both sides to the appeal by the Acting SG and felt that the time was propitious for the parties concerned to come together and begin negotiations with the assistance of the Acting SG. On a motion by the UAR, supported by Ghana, the Council adjourned sine die.”

2.4 Otros hechos

1. Los misiles en Turquía no estaban operativos y se planeaban retirar de todas maneras.
2. en el 61 EEUU termina relaciones consulares y diplomáticas con Cuba
3. Febrero del 62 inicia el bloqueo a Cuba
4. se le dice cuarentena y no bloqueo porque la ultima implica un acto de guerra.
5. La presión duro hasta el 20 de Noviembre del 1962
6. México y Argentina también creen que el problema inicia por la rencilla interna entre Cuba y Estados Unidos, mas por la obsesión de la ultima.

Chapter 3

República Árabe Unida

3.1 Datos básicos

1. Nombre oficial: República Árabe Unida
2. Presidente: Gamal Abdel Nasser
3. Tipo de Gobierno: gobierno centralista socialista
4. Religión: Islam, previamente el gobierno era secular.

3.2 Postura

Principios de Bandung

1. Respeto por los derechos fundamentales del hombre y para los fines y principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
2. Respeto para la soberanía y la integridad territorial de todas las naciones.
3. Reconocimiento de la igualdad de todas las razas y de todas las naciones, grandes y pequeñas.
4. Abstención de intervenciones o interferencia en los asuntos internos de otros países.
5. Respeto al derecho de toda nación a defenderse por sí sola o en colaboración con otros Estados, en conformidad con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
6. Abstención de participar en acuerdos de defensa colectiva con vistas a favorecer los intereses particulares de una de las grandes potencias.
7. Abstención por parte de todo país a ejercitar presión sobre otros países.
8. Abstención de actos o de amenaza de agresión y del uso de la fuerza en los cotejos de la integridad territorial o de independencia política de cualquier país.

9. Composición de todas las vertientes internacionales con medios pacíficos, como tratados, conciliaciones, arbitraje o composición judicial, así como también con otros medios pacíficos, según la libre selección de las partes en conformidad con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
10. Promoción del interés y de la cooperación recíproca.
11. Respeto por la justicia y las obligaciones internacionales.
12. Hacer valer las creencias de las distintas culturas internacionales del Movimiento.

Chapter 4

Propuestas

1. Realizar las negociaciones antes de tiempo mediante el cambio de presidencia para el tema
2. Revisar las acciones de la OEA sobre el tema.
3. Negociar con ambos para que el acuerdo generado también contenga la protección de Cuba y la neutralización de Alemania
4. Reintegrar a Cuba a la OEA / Suspender la medida mediante el artículo 40.
5. Usar a U Thant para facilitar una cumbre entre las 3 partes Naciones Unidas y un mediador (nosotros)
6. Al transformar la OEA en una organización irrepresentativa se debe dudar de su capacidad para resolver el problema.
7. Ir a Unión pro paz y invocar una reunión de emergencia especial para consideración de acciones universales si se dan varios vetos
8. Medida provisional de suspensión de actividades tripartita y verificarla