

# Structure

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:35 PM

## Authorities of the Union:

- Josif Stalin - All round ruler of the Union after the end of WWII.

Authorities of the Country: In Here as in all USSR countries we had 2 figures that shared power.

- Head of State(Chairman of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada): Mykhailo Hrechukha
- Leader of the Party(First Secretary of the Central Committee):Nikita Khrushchev
- Chairman of the Supreme Soviet: Oleksandr Korniychuk - the head of the legislative system

## Representatives in the GA:

Ukraine

First session

Dmitro Z. Manuilsky

Mikola P. Bajan

Mikola I. Petrovsky

Olexa D. Voina

Vasil A. Tarasenko

Second session

Dmitro Z. Manuilsky

A. M. Baranovsky

A. D. Voina

L. I. Medved

First special session

Ivan Aleksandrovich Tolkhunov

Dmitro Z. Manuilsky was chairman of the First Committee (DISEC)

USSR

First session

Andrei Y. Vyshinsky

Andrei A. Gromyko

Feodor T. Gousev

Anatolii I. Lavrentiev

Vasilii V. Kuznetsov

Second session

Viacheslav M. Molotov

Andrei Y. Vyshinski

Fedor T. Gousev

Andrei A. Gromyko

Nikolai V. Novikov

Kirill V. Novikov

Vladimir S. Geraschenko

Boris E. Stein

Alexandr A. Lavrishev

Amazasp A. Arutiunian

First Special session  
Andrei A. Gromyko  
Semen K. Tsarapkin  
Alexei N. Krasilnikov

Capital: Kiev

Government Type:

- Soviet Socialist Republic - Stalinist type: overly centralized state, totalitarian figure head, secret police, propaganda, and especially brutal tactics of political coercion. According to [Encyclopædia Britannica](#), "Stalinism is associated with a regime of terror and totalitarian rule." Stalinism defines the type of government not the ideology. Contrary to what Engels states on the Principles of Communism Stalin thought that the revolution should first be taken and constructed only in the USSR and after to other countries, and the principles stated that the range of the revolution should be universal, on Stalinist State it is common to find the repression of Political opposition through violent means. Also an increased cult to personality is seen.
- Ideology: Marxist-Leninist: promotes single party, worker based government. It is based on :
  - Egalitarianism: is the thought that humans are equal in some aspects
  - Dialectical Materialism: establishes that every economic order grows to its maximum and in the process it becomes contradictory, thus bringing down the order.
  - Rationalism : Appealing to reason as a Source of knowledge and justification.
  - Atheism
  - Social progress: is the Idea that a Society can improve its conditionsIt supports a centrally planned state economy, and looks forward for elimination of Private property.

Verkhovna Rada: is the Supreme Council of Ukraine, is the parliament of Ukraine at the time and actually. Its Unicameral.

It is annexed to the USSR on December 19 of 1922

Stance towards the situation: First of all as all of the SSR's in the Cold War Period, the main Foreign policy was the one of the USSR, and as such the role of the other countries was to solidify the Stance of the USSR and have more votes. In a manner of speaking the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR are the same country actually , since the union is being represented by the USSR. So it is one Stance 2 speeches, 2 votes.

# Position paper

Monday, September 12, 2011  
4:30 PM

How do we call the right of the people of having its rightful home, after suffering the worst horrors in the history of mankind? Do we call it compassion and pity? Or should we call it Justice? This claim should not be based on religious arguments, but under the principle of self determination of peoples, the right all of the peoples of the United Nations have to exist, develop and be respected. How do we call forgetting the promises and pledges made to different peoples that assured them, what they desired the most? How do we call not ensuring a Non Self Governing Territory their rights enshrined in Article 73 of the Charter? What is it worse, to deny a right? Or to remain silent until the rightful owners of such a claim turn to each other? As we can see inaction is also a weapon of mass destruction.

We Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic believe that colonialism had taken its toll on the Palestinian people; it consumed the hope that was left after so much pain, and gave its way for the hate to grow. We saw this when in the General Assembly at its second meeting of September 26 of 1947 the parties concerned established their positions regarding the recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), Our delegation saw something that determined why is the Security Council discussing this now, each of the parties had a different stance, and all of them were intransigent with the other parties concerned. This led the UNSCOP to make a series of recommendations that embodied two plans, one that embraced all the peoples in Palestine in one country, and the other that was a consequence of what we saw in the General Assembly, that is the Partition Plan we voted in favor of.

Our delegation strongly believes that the path to peace is marked by the spirit of this Partition plan and by Resolution 181(II) of the General Assembly. However the implementation of this resolution requires the strong will of the members of the United Nations to be carried out. Here we make mention to paragraphs a, b and c which establishes the duty the Security Council must take in the implementation of this plan. Naturally the task the Security Council must embody is the one established in Chapter V of the Charter which is to safeguard international peace and security. Regarding paragraph a, in the Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission(S/663 of January 31st of the present year) we can find several setbacks that the report points out to be taken into consideration, specially the highly technical problems that they are facing and that they can't manage because they are not prepared to do so, these problems are pointed out in parts 5, 13 and summarized in part 14.

In part 14 we can acknowledge the priority the Commission has given to the negotiations with the mandatory power, the Council must help the commission and ask the mandatory power to cease its inaction policy and to fully cooperate with the commission and the implementation of the partition plan. Regarding the technical help the president of the Council should send a letter to the General Assembly and the Secretary General to answer the petitions made by the Commission regarding the technical help. The Security Considerations stated in part 13 of the report show us that the parties concerned must cooperate in order to solve the issues affecting the security in Palestine. Also to reinforce this action the Security Council must call all the member states to refrain from any action that can further deteriorate the situation in Palestine. Regarding paragraphs b and c we consider that two things should be done, first a deeper report regarding the security situation in the region should be requested to the Commission, and when this report arrives the permanent members should debate and consult between them if Article 39 of the Charter is applicable and report to the Council if such a threat exists and they must also report how the Council should address the situation and consider the application of Article 42

under the scope of Article 106 and its implications regarding the partition plan, but if such a threat does not exist then they should develop recommendations on how the Council should address the situation. Furthermore we believe that to supplement the authority of the General Assembly through paragraph b of Resolution 181(II) should be one of the last resources in the addressing of a critical moment in the situation so the Council can empower the commission not only with Article 41 but with Article 42 for the establishment of the conditions for the partition plan. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic considers that the claims of the rightful parties to the situation must be taken into account when the policies and actions, regardless if it's under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, are drawn.

The fundamental rights and freedoms of Arabs and Jews alike must be respected by these actions. The United Kingdom cannot continue playing its colonialist, apathetic and selfish policy of waiting that the parties come along through an act of magic instead of taking responsibility of its unfulfilled pledges and cooperate with the Commission and with the Council in the settlement of the dispute. We must remember that the decision of remaining silent and not taking actions it also has consequences, and as we can see these consequences are of the most hideous ones. There are few actions that can be actually taken under Article 33 of the Charter by the Council, Negotiation, we have seen the disputes between the parties and it has always been present the unwillingness to negotiate; Enquiry, it's under the Commissions duties established in paragraph 14 of part B of the Resolution 181(II) to report to the Council its findings; Mediation; It's responsibility of the Commission and the Mandatory Power to respond to this duty by founding a middle point of conciliation between the parties; Conciliation, it's clear that neither of the parties is willing to proceed to a conciliation process; Arbitration, the legal conditions of the Palestine situation hasn't existed because it's a non Self – Governing Territory; Judicial Settlement, there is no need for it since the plan already exists; Resort to regional agencies or arrangements, None of the regional agencies can assure the impartiality that the situation needs, furthermore the majority of the regional agencies in the area are mainly composed of Arab Nations; Other peaceful means of their own choice, If they cannot agree to any kind of negotiation process It would be harder to establish those other peaceful means. However the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic will be glad to call for the use of Article 36 of the Charter if the conditions are met. We believe peace can return to this region, we believe that just as peace returned to Europe, peace can return to Palestine.

Since the Council actually cannot use the measures under Article 33 for the reasons exposed in the previous lines, we believe that in order to prevent the aggravation of the situation the Council should use provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter that shall bolster the security capacities in Palestine. Calling the Member States of the Organization to refrain from any action that can worsen the political and security situation it's a head start that with the help of the Council, with the use of Article 40, will transform into a policy for peace. Another measure that can be taken under the scope of this article is calling the Mandatory Power to cooperate with the commission under its duties enshrined in Article 73.

“Justice and power must be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and whatever is powerful may be just.” – Blaise Pascal

# Background(Previous to the UN creation)

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:39 PM

The constant persecution that the Jews suffered in many parts of the world even previous to the WWI and WWII, led them to create a series of organizations that helped in the process of looking how to return to Zion, as Zionism rose as the principal thought of the Jewish community, they purchase of Lands in the Palestine region began, and maintained during Ottoman rule and British rule, this gave a huge amount of time to the Jew Community to establish in the area and proliferate.

The leader of the Arab Community sensed that the action the Jews were taking was highly offensive specially by the Arab farmers of the region that felt their lands were taken away from them. So the Ottomans placed purchase regulations. And after a series of complex events the empire forbade the selling of lands to foreigners in 1892, but this did not stop the Jewish immigration so by 1914 they were 66 thousand in the area, and roughly the half of them were newcomers.

When WWI busted the Ottoman empire aligned with the Central Powers (Germany and Friends), this caused several changes in the allegiance of the Arabs in the region. The British negotiated a free Arab state if they revolted against the Ottoman empire, and so they did and by 1917 the British had already won in the region. At the same time 2 agreements were made, the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and after the end of the war, we had the 1919 Paris Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. Which finally removed the land from Ottoman Rule and passed it to British Rule. (at this point go to the other treaties page in the Committee section)

The British Managed to establish a first Arab state in the area of Transjordan, and gave the administration to the Hashemite dynasty of the Hejaz region from Saudi Arabia, thus eliminating that part of the territory as part of a possible Jew State. Jew Immigration to Palestine continued to grow specially because anti-Semitism was growing in Europe. Furthermore the Jewish European Immigrants began to expand through the region over lands that were abandoned and over the lands that long ago were bought by other Jewish organizations. When WWII was about to begin the population of Palestine doubled because of the exile.

From 1920 the Arabs in the Palestine region as a reaction to the massive influx of Jew immigrants began forming gangs that increased the hostility towards the Jew community, thus applying terror techniques and murder. This hatred increased with the preparation of WWII and as the leader of the Arab Community in Palestine was almost a pro Nazi things got really messy, Amin al-Husayni fled Palestine because it was wanted by British authorities, we returned after the end of the war. The constant massacres in the area led the British government to make a series of commissions and documents to address the clearly complicated situation.(go to the second part of legal stuff of the Committee section).

The situation stagnated during the period of WWII and the tension began to rise more with the passing of days. When the war ended and the British government took its normal flow then they realized situation was really complex. Arabs and Jews were against British Occupation aside from that they were against each other. (see third part of the legal stuff and then go to Causes after the UN go created in this section)

## Causes(after the UN got established)

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:36 PM

In the UN the partition plan three division were stated for the region, a Jewish State with predominant Jew majority, an Arab State under the same composition and a international zone comprising Jerusalem and surrounding areas where both groups will be equal. However the parties didn't like the plan, the Jews didn't want to lose Jerusalem, however many Jews in the area accepted the plan and the Jewish Agency (the government somehow) campaigned hardly in favor of it, but the different stances of the Jews led to rejecting it. The GA approved the partition plan in 1947, the Arab countries defeated, took the inquiry to the ICJ to dismiss the resolution and determine that the GA was acting out of its powers and nullify the partition but got defeated again.

With the Partition Approved violence erupted, and the consulates of the nations that approved were endangered o even damaged by terrorist attacks. A violence cycle began and in May 14 one day before the British Mandate expired David Ben Gurion Declared the independence of Israel and with that began the conflict

So practically the cause of the Conflict is the Partition Plan and the Independence of Israel.

# Inside the UN 1947

Thursday, August 11, 2011  
11:38 PM

The UK made a request to the SG that the Question for the Future Government for Palestine, to add it to the agenda of the next session and to make a special meeting to prepare the Organization and create a committee for the situation. The Arab Countries led by Egypt made a request that another point should be submitted to the Special Meeting, the point was submitted as "The termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence", however the proposal did not pass. (pages 278 - 290 Yearbook 1947), and the UK's proposal was the only one for the Special meeting. The Arabs had a series of arguments to which they stated their proposal should be in the agenda, those were:

- a. They stated the independence of Palestine was already recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations and by statements of the Allied Powers, and that the Balfour Declaration and the League mandate over Palestine were contradictory to the Covenant and looked to impose the will of one people over the other.
- b. They stated that the problem was not of facts but of principles that during time the interests of the colonial power shaped the mandate many times, they stated that the principles of the Charter should be applied, since the Charter states that if other obligations were inconsistent with those of the Charter the ones of the Charter should prevail, this is related to Art 2.4 that makes a reference to article 1.
- c. They said that establishing a committee was losing time and that all that was needed was to apply the principles of the Charter and declare an independent Palestine, through democratic lines. And waiting for the results of the Committee will just let Zionism to get stronger and more tense.
- d. They considered that the process should be to notify the GA that the territory was ready, then to make a trusteeship agreement, and relinquish the mandate. They established that those had to be the steps towards ending the problem.
- e. They thought both proposals should be taken into the agenda because the matter was too urgent that it required adequate guiding.
- f. The problem could be solved just by using the principles, and if the committee was appointed they will also work under them so it was a waste of time using the committee.
- g. Independence was the only solution.
- h. They believed that not discussing the situation will do greater harm than discussing it.
- i. And that discussing it will not mean that independence should be granted immediately.
- j. This topic will not diminish the priority of the demands of the Jews, since the Jewish question was a separate one from the Palestinian one. Besides the case of the Jews will still be heard.

The Position of the UK was that they were looking for a solution that was accepted by both of the parties. Enforcing a solution not accepted by the parties could not be possible and the UK would not enforce it.

On May 2nd the Egyptian representative in reply to various statements that they did not represent the Palestinian people. USA stated that the Jewish agency could make statements regarding the situations but they could not be acknowledged as a complete representation of all Jews of the world.

On May 6th in a discussion of the First Committee of the GA, UK established that the Arab High committee was the representative of The Arab population in Palestine.

On May 8 when the Jewish agency was granted its hearing, Dr Silver stated that two concepts were highly important, "The Jewish People" and "The Jewish national Home", since they were concepts that existed since the Balfour declaration and had a profound importance to the Jews. They looked at the

declaration as an International Obligation and a historic right for their people and that could not be thrown away. They also established that the Mandatory power had made the work for the establishment of the Jewish National Home more harder and that with this opportunity the chance came once again. Dr Silver also stated that 2 of the sources of the violence in the region, first that the Mandatory power was making more difficult to access into the territory and second that the Power had established racial laws that harmed the people and led them to overcrowding of a region that was less than 6% of the country, but the problem was that the mandate and the laws passed stated that the Power was to do the contrary.

Mr Ben Gurion also called for a Jewish-Arab alliance and for a Jewish State. .

The Arab high committee made its statement of May 9th. They stated that previous to the Balfour declaration another pledge had been made, called the MacMahon pledge of 1915, where independence of many areas were promised to be Arab administered, specially actual Palestine. And when the Balfour Declaration was issued, King Faisal asked for an explanation since it was not consulted with them and they stated in the Hogarth Message that a Jewish settlement will be allowed while it is consistent with the political and economical freedom for the Arab Population.

After their interventions the states made questions to both parties, the Jews were asked on May 8th and answered on May 12, The Arabs were asked on May 9th and answered on May 12.

On May 12 The Jewish Agency said they were representatives of all the Jews in the World (remember USA said on May 2nd that they could not be acknowledged as that.) Poland asked the Jewish Agency if Jews and Arabs cooperate between each other and the answer was quite positive, but Poland asked the Arab High Committee if they could cooperate (as an organization) with the Jewish agency and their answer was quite negative.

**On May 9 the USSR made an amendment to the subcommittee that was assigned to merge the Argentinian and American draft resolutions into one in the amendment they**

- a. urged for the investigation to be carried on the spot**
- b. That they should collect and analyse all the data they could related to the problem of Palestine and other related problems, in the collection of data they could grant hearing to whom the committee considered appropriate.**
- c. To submit a proposal for the question of establishing an independent state in Palestine.**

**These amendments were made without criticizing the merged draft proposal but they considered that with the amendments the work of the committee will be more concrete.**

On the meeting of May 12 a draft was delivered by the subcommittee for the parameters that the committee of inquiry will follow on its work, this included:

- Which were the best sources for information
- The powers of the committee for requesting such information
- That they should elaborate proposals to be delivered to the Assembly, regarding the problems of displaced people and the future government of Palestine.

The Arab States through an speech of the representative of Syria rejected in their speeches, claiming that in 1946 they had made a series of concession to the UK government in a meeting of the States of the League of Arab States and the UK government, those were:

- "Creation of a provisional executive council to be composed of Arabs and Jews, and presided over by the British representative;
- Summoning by free election in which all citizens of Palestine, without discrimination as to nationality, creed, or faith, would participate,

of a constituent assembly to promulgate an organic, democratic constitution guaranteeing: the unity of the State with the elected legislature;

- The sanctity of the Holy Places with freedom of access and worship; religious courts for matters of personal status;
- Rights of citizenship;
- The right to employ the Hebrew language as a second official language in areas where speakers of that language form an absolute majority;
- Communal parliamentary representation in proportion to the number of citizens; further immigration to be prohibited until the independent Government of Palestine provides otherwise;
- Supervision by the United Nations over the status of the Holy places and shrines; after the election and convocation of parliament, the elected head of the State to assume power under the constitution, thereupon terminating the Mandate, and declaring Palestine a completely independent State."

Syria Stated that the concessions will just take 2 years to entry into force.

**USSR made an amendment that helped the wording of the clause regarding the consideration of the peoples of the region. The wording proposed was :**

**"The special committee in studying the problem of Palestine shall give full consideration to guarantees of the rights of its people necessary to the peace and independence of that country"**

**The USSR and India, and Poland after them, tried to amend the paragraph regarding the proposal the committee should bring, were they tried to include that a proposal for independence should also be submitted to the assembly.**

**On may 13 proposals were made regarding the composition of the committee, the USSR proposed the just the P5 or the P5 + 1 western Europe + 1 eastern Europe + 2 Latin America + 1 Arab + 1 Far East and Africa. Needless to say that they were two stances in the debate, that the permanents were included and to do not let them in. Both proposals were rejected.**

As the discussion regarding the committee went further the Arab States were deeply concerned and most of them voted against or abstained because the situation for which the Assembly gathered was to help the UK on the future government of Palestine not to prepare of the consideration of the Problem of Palestine. When the plenary meeting gathered in may 14th and 15th for the report of the First committee, they repeated their concern, adding to their argument that the argument the "Problem of Problem of Palestine was a really vague term", and that the First committee did have the powers to change the reference of from "the Future Government of Palestine" to "the Question of Palestine".

**The USSR representative stated that the complex political situation had placed the UN in a position for the establishment of a Solution. It called the special commission to study the factual information, that will reveal that the mandate has no reason for existing, and to work for the reconcile the lawful rights and interests of the Jews and Arabs, and if possible determine if a single state with equal rights could be possible if not to consider a 2 states solution.**

Then the resolution was adopted and after an Appeal for peace was adopted on may 14th that called for the refraining of threat of use of force and to denounce it to the special committee.

The members of the committee(UNSCOP) were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia; Sweden was the president and Peru the Vice president. This was adopted in resolution A/RES/106 (S-1) on May 15th 1947 as well as the peace pledge the was introduced for collaboration by governments and peoples, specially the inhabitants of Palestine. Regarding the refraining in the use of force or any other action that might cause more violence and damage the negotiation process.

The Arab High committee refused to collaborate with the committee, and the Jewish agency collaborated fully with it. Instead the Arab states attended the committee on the request of the council.

When the recommendations of the UNSCOP arrived the UK restated its policy and made emphasis in not applying measures that were not accepted by the parties, but that support all recommendations made by the GA (quite a bit contradictory), The Arab High committee stated that the UK had overstepped article 6 of the British Mandate over palestine.

Note: the Jewish Agency and the Arab High committee were never recognized in the League of Nations.

Note: The Jewish agency was part of the Mandate administration.

Note: an extract of the Yearbook previous to the GA second special session points out some of the causes why the Commission was not successful, this is an extract of the report of the Commission for the GA **(A/532, between April 2nd and 10th)**:

"The Commission . . . has the duty to report to the General Assembly that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-operation from the Mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution"

**Regarding the Trusteeship Council, On January 23rd the situation regarding the special status of Jerusalem could not be discussed in the SC, since the task was appointed to the TC, however the Arab Position was quite solid regarding why the process was illegal Iraq stated that.**

**(1) The City of Jerusalem was an integral part of Palestine, deserving independence in the same degree as did the people of the rest of Palestine. The fact that the City was sacred to three religions provided no legal basis for separation.**

**(2) According to the Charter, Trusteeship was to be an intermediary step leading towards self-government or independence. Permanent Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem was therefore illegal.**

**(3) According to the Charter, a Trusteeship Agreement had to be presented to the General Assembly by the party or parties concerned. The Charter did not acknowledge the authority of the General Assembly as the sole originator of such an Agreement; as the United Kingdom, the Mandatory Power,**

**had not presented a Trusteeship Agreement, the General Assembly had no right to draft a constitution of Trusteeship.**

**(4) Under the Charter, the Trusteeship Council itself could not act as a trustee. Only a state could perform that function; the true function of the Trusteeship Council was that of supervision.**

**Finally, the representative of Iraq maintained that if the Plan for Jerusalem was to be regarded as a special arrangement not intended to fit within the Trusteeship System then the Council was not acting under Chapter XII of the Charter and could not act legally at all in the matter.**

# Actual Ground(1948)

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:37 PM

On December 9 the Council took note of the letter from the SG (**S/614**) to draw the council attention towards the request of the Assembly regarding the resolution 181, the council decided to postpone the meeting. In February 10th 1948 the first discussion of the Palestinian Question began, but it was solely the report however the commission will deliver some information that will require the determination of the council with a special report on the next meeting. On the meeting of February 24 the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Committee were invited to the council to give the information the Council requested. The Chairman of the Commission stated that the Problem of security was the first one that needed to be solved if the partition plan of the GA was to be implemented. USA stated that **paragraphs a, b and c of part A** were not as easy to fulfill, the only one easy to fulfill was paragraph a, the other 2 raised a problem over the jurisdiction of the Council since it could only react as the resolution demanded if there was actually evidence that empowered the council to do so, such evidence did not exist also the US introduced a Draft resolution (**S/685**) that proposed a committee to advise the Council on which course of action they should take. UK Stated that they will not participate in enforcement of the measure they believed that the solution must be accepted peacefully by both parties, however it did not reject the GA resolution.

President = China;

On the meeting of February 24th Syria stated that the GA passed the whole burden to the SC regarding the implementation, furthermore paragraphs b and c could not be applied since the Council had no power to maintain internal order of a country since it is a domestic issue, and the GA did not have the power to create states neither arrange the political and economical order of a region. The lack of arrangements between the UN and its members regarding **articles 42 and 43** led the Colombian delegation to propose on its draft Resolution (**S/684**) the use of article 106 for the requirements of the GA.

On the meeting of February 25th Egypt stated that fulfilling the partition plan will lead to strife and the arrival of the Commission will just worsen the situation, So they thought that make heed to the Assembly will be a fatal blow to International Security.

On February 27th Belgium made a modification to the US resolution (**S/688**) which deleted the acceptance of the orders by the Assembly. Colombia also accepted the fact that the council has no force to partition furthermore in that case then the Commission set by resolution 181 of GA couldn't start as soon as it was required so it will be necessary to get to an agreement with the Jews and the Arabs, this will mean that maybe the partition plan should be renegotiated. The UK didn't accept the paragraph of accepting the request of the Assembly since it will not participate in the plan unless both parties agreed.

**On March 2nd The URSS stated that they accepted the fact that consultation should be made by the Permanent members, but not accepted the fact that the consultation should be also made to Arabs and Jews since the Commission of Resolution 181 of the GA had already done that and also sent a report to the Council. He had no objections with accepting the request of the GA, and said that the consultations between the P5 should be delivered in a maximum of 15 days. Then after various discussion on the amendments the USSR proposal of amendment regarding to not create the committee was accepted and the other regarding to consult were not added and USSR (ergo Ukraine) abstained.**

Then the report on the Consultations Arrived on March 19 (**S/P.V. 270**). **The USSR was the only member that participated in the consultations that didn't accept the report, due to certain considerations regardless of how productive they were the USSR stated that during the process the principles, by which all situations treated by the SC should be treated, had been laid down. USSR rejected the proposal of the US during the consultations to continue negotiations after the consultations, since the Commission was already doing it. Also stated that Part I of the report was merely factual since the commission reported the same things, so that part lacked of importance, particularly paragraph 4 that spoke about the impossibility to peacefully implementing the plan, to the consideration of USSR it's not the position of all parties but the position of the Jewish Agency. Regarding Part II it stated that all members accepted them but USSR considered them all nonetheless too vague, and specifically the part of the infiltration by land and sea, it was clear that the real danger was the infiltration by land.**

Regarding the report the Arabs, represented by Syria, stated that they were willing to create another peaceful solution for Palestine, and that the Jews were receiving military immigrants and war material, of which the Arabs were deprived of, the Arabs considered that the consultations missed the fact that the Council could not enforce the consultations, thus a reference to the Assembly should be necessary. **Egypt criticized the representative of the USSR for the prompt implementation of the Partition plan.** Egypt urged the council to do not accept the request of the council without a full debate. United States established that the administrative tasks that the GA issued in its resolution did not make the UN heir to the British Mandate of Palestine and neither the 181 resolution gave the UN a governmental role in Palestine. However they proposed further negotiations since the report stated that the plan couldn't be implemented peacefully, and also called for the council to inter alia call the GA to establishment of a temporary trusteeship to bolster the security needs to apply the plan. The Jews didn't support the temporary trusteeship proposal because they considered it will be to give up the progress of the plan before a threat to violence of some of the members. **The USSR did not believe that the plan could not be achieved peacefully, and also**

**considered that the proposals made by the USA could not be based on the report, instead the report gave the basis upon which the Council should work for the implementation of the plan.**

On March 24th Canada and France thought that this new proposal of the USA could bring time for negotiations and understanding between the parties, but they were not ready to make a vote for the proposal. Lebanon believed that deep study of the USA proposal will be futile since the GA was called into special session and that should be discussed by them and Egypt thought that any delay for the plan to reconsider it or renegotiate it was right.

On March 30th the USA introduced 2 draft resolutions(**S/704**)(**S/705**) the first one calls the Arab High committee and the Jewish Agency to give to the disposal of the Council two representatives for negotiations and calls for a cease of violence. The second one calls for the special session of the GA to further consider the future government of Palestine. Furthermore USA believed a Trusteeship was necessary for the establishment of Order. **The USSR considered that the establishment of the trusteeship was out of order because it was contradictory with the stance of all the delegations voting in favor of the resolution in the GA including the USA, adding to this the USSR stated that this was a change of position by the USA that came from supporting the plan to refused to support it and now it raised the question of leaving the resolution without effect, the USSR became more incisive by stating that the wrecking of the plan was part of the USA position, leaving the Jews and the Arabs without states of their own and placing the USA's interests above the common good of the UN. And also refused to call the general assembly for an special session just for a revision of a previous decision and refused the proposal of calling the Palestine Commission to suspend its work since it was working towards the implementation, furthermore the USSR representative stated that the Commission could not stop as long as the GA resolution remained in force.**

At April 1st the Jewish representative called for the draft S/704 to address the problem of the Arab Aggression and Egypt stated that they were not participating in the strife, and supported the S/704 that called for a truce. **Ukraine amended the USA resolution by deleting the wording of "with grave concern" and leaving it as "Notes the increasing violence..." USA accepted.** S/704 and S/705 were adopted, see resolutions 43 and 44 for more details. The council decided that the President of the council should guide the negotiations and report them to the council. The president reported that after two days the negotiations seemed fruitless and began consultations with the Council members to make recommendations to the GA special session.

On April 15 the council met for the report of the president and he presented a proposal as representative of Colombia(**S/722**). The Jewish Agency objected to paragraph 1 and its subparagraphs completely, the important objection was regarding to immigration since the resolution on its paragraph 1 stated in one of its subparagraphs that the parties should refrain from bringing individuals, arms or individuals capable of bringing arms since it will hamper natural immigration and that the inclusion of a political matter will deviate the and vitiate the possible truce, Egypt stated the contrary and even if it had some objections he accepted the spirit of the resolution.

The discussion of the draft resolution continued to April 16th **The representative of the USSR stated that paragraph 1a of the Colombian proposal was to wide and was unpractical for the establishment of a truce. Regarding 1b and paragraph 3 he stated that it did not consider the rights of the Jews regarding immigration. And stated that paragraph 1c will not be enough and another action to enforce such a decision should be taken by the council and so he amended it (regarding the acquisition of weapons and war material). To finish with its statement he stated that the wording of "freedom of action" that will be given to the UK in paragraph 2 was unclear, furthermore he considered it unsatisfactory and that placed security as a second objective and placed political matters in a higher level, which will make thing more complicated.** USA and France supported the resolution and clarified that the truce was a temporary measure, the Arab High committee supported a truce, but not a truce that was preliminary to the partition plan and also called for the expulsion of Jewish terrorist gangs and denounced the establishment of Jewish administration in the region devised by the partition plan. **The USSR and Ukraine voted in favor of paragraph 4 that called the SG to appoint three members of the secretariat to assist the UK in the implementation of the truce as observers, this clause was rejected.** The Arab High committee called that instead of calling for members of the Secretariat with consular careers holders stationed in Jerusalem that were of the countries of the Council will be better because of their knowledge, the Jews called that if the supervision of the Truce was made by the UK it was like there were no supervision at all. And so resolution 46 was approved.

At the meeting of April 23 progress of the truce was asked to the parties involved. The UK stated that the resolution had been published but their efforts to apply the truce was fruitless mainly because the Arab leaders were hard to find, the Arab High Committee claimed that the Jews had no intention to accept the truce, and if the situation was frozen militarily and politically then they would cease fire. USA proposed a draft resolution with a Truce Commission that will be composed of all members of the SC except Syria that will help the council in the implementation of resolution 46. **Ukraine established that the terms of resolution 46 were impossible to implement and therefore the proposal of USA was not leading the council to a truce. USSR established that resolution 46 did not include the minimum requirements for a truce, mainly the fact that the withdrawal of troops that that opposed partition. He also stated that the proposal was part of a design of the USA to force the UN to adopt trusteeship.**

After some changes Resolution 48 was adopted, see the committee section for more information.

On April 30th the situation was really critical and the Truce Commission sent a cablegram (**S/732**) with the report that activities were almost at a standstill and that violence was increasing, On May 1st the Jewish Agency called the SC due to reports of invasion with regular

troops of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt(S/730).

At the end of the Discussion in May 12, the Truce Commission asked through letters (S/741 May 9)(S/742 May 10) for military assistance for enforcing the truce, this help could be given by the UN or by the IRC(International Red Cross).

On May 15 Egypt sent a letter(S/743) that they sent their forces for the establishment of peace and order in Palestine and the SG of the Arab League also sent a letter(S/745) explaining the reasons for the action and hoped to have the approval of the UN . The Jewish Agency remembered its telegrams regarding Arab Aggression (S/730, S/736 & S/738). The Jewish agency considered insane what Egypt had stated , The State of Israel had been established and they will use what they can to defend themselves, and established that the actions of the Arab states were a breach of peace and aggression, that should be penalized through chapter VII. The Arab high committee questioned the argument of the Jewish Agency, since the Arab High Committee invited the other Arab states to enter the region and since the mandate had ended, then Palestine as a while was an independent state and Jews a religious minority. **Here the Ukrainian SSR made a question to Egypt asking what were the purposes of Egypt in Palestine since the right to maintain order inside a territory corresponds to the government.**

And on May 16th Transjordan sent a letter (S/748) stating that they had entered the region because they had to defend the Arab population of Palestine from a Massacre.

On the meeting of May 17th the USA presented two things, first a draft resolution(S/749), since the information the council possessed regarding Palestine pointed out a breach to peace that fell under the scope of article 39. after this in the meetings of May 18th the second proposal of the USA appeared, a questionnaire to be submitted to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, the final questionnaire was S/753 and the answers were to be delivered 48 hours after May 19 at noon. The USSR stated that the Council just lost enough time in the creation of the questionnaire and there was enough information to determine if a breach to peace existed. Transjordan made a reply to the council (S/760) where they stated that the USA proposed the questionnaire but had still not recognized Transjordan even after they met all the conditions for such a recognition, he pointed out that USA recognized the government of Israel and just moments after its creation, even if this new state didn't meet the requirements, and so they will not answer the questionnaire.

At this point Israel existed and was recognized by the USSR, they stated on the reply to the questionnaire on May 22nd that they had control over the region the Partition plan stated and maintained their presence in the Truce commission and they were to make one but the Arabs did not. On May 19th the UK stated that he agreed with the draft resolution of the USA but the form was not the most appropriate because of the doubts article 39 brought and because of the status of the aggressor and the aggression, thus he amended the USA draft resolution (S/755), USA opposed the amendment since it changed the scope from chapter VII to chapter VIII thus eliminating the consideration of a threat to peace, Belgium spoke in favor of UK since the Council didn't have forces of its own and maybe article 106 could not be applied.

**On the meeting of May 19th Ukraine stated that consideration of the breach of peace and aggression should be done with the available information, this meant the document sent by Egypt and Transjordan, that clearly revealed the presence of military forces with a political purpose. Furthermore he added that the creation and the acknowledgement of Israel by 8 states became another factor to be considered. He blamed UK for letting Transjordan troops enter into Palestine.**

The commission recommended that the Council should look for a way to enforce their decisions, and to this point it was clear that both parties wanted a ceasefire. **Then the USSR stated that partition was still valid in Palestine and it required the efforts of all members to come into real force. He criticized UK for supporting Transjordan and by preventing the Council for taking a decision to prevent the breach to peace that existed in Palestine. He also stated that it was nonsense to rely solely in the Mediator and the Commission since first had no more powers than the last, and the latter couldn't prevent this warlike situation so a really solid decision was needed so he stated that the USA resolution was a basis for a decision of the Council. Then resolution 49 was adopted.**

On May 24 and 26th The Jews sent a communication accepting the truce and after the Arabs stated that they wanted some guarantees from the Jews that they will not bring more immigration to be used in the military furthermore it gave no guarantees from Zionist attack. **On May 26th Ukraine stated that a firm decision from the council was needed and that UK was delaying it and giving help to the Arabs.**

On May 29, the Council proceeded to vote on the resolutions before it. **The U.S.S.R. resolution was put to the vote first**, the first paragraph being voted on in two parts at the request of the representative of Colombia. The first part of the first paragraph received 5 votes in favor (Belgium, France, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United States), with 6 abstentions, and was not adopted. The reference to the refusal of the Arab States to comply with the Council's previous decision of May 22 was rejected by a vote of 2 in favor (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 9 abstentions. **The vote on the remaining four paragraphs of the resolution again was 5 in favor, with 6 abstentions. The U.S.S.R. resolution therefore was not adopted.** The Council then considered the United Kingdom resolution, paragraph by paragraph, and amendments were proposed by the representatives of the United States, France, Colombia, Canada and Syria and suggestions by the Jewish Agency. After the United Kingdom (S/801) resolution had been adopted as **resolution 50**, the President, speaking as the representative of France, withdrew his own draft resolution (S/798/Rev.2) regarding a truce in Jerusalem.

**March 12, 1948 (S/694)**, the representative of Chile informed the Secretary-General that his Government had noted that, on March 10, 1948, Jan Papanek, permanent representative of Czechoslovakia, had sent a communication to the Secretary-General. Mr. Papanek had alleged that **the political independence of Czechoslovakia had been violated by the threat of the use of force by the U.S.S.R., and that this situation endangered the maintenance of international peace.**

The resolutions adopted by the Council on April 17 (**S/723**) and May 22 (**S/773**), 1948, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

June 1 the security council considers that the truce should last only 4 weeks and they should computed but it couldn't get establish so they decided it was better to leave it to the mediator, and let him negotiated with both parties to finally establish a truce end.

June 4, 1948 The UN mediator informed the president of the Security Council that he had been negotiating with the parties concerning the effective date of the truce and the only problem obstructing the agreement was the immigration into Palestine during the truce. The representative of the Jewish Agency expressed surprise that the cease-fire order issued by the Provisional Government of Israel had met with no response either from the Arabs or the Council. The immediate task of the Mediator should be to obtain a cease-fire rather than to discuss technical details pertaining to the provisions of the resolution. Following further negotiations with the representatives of both parties the Mediator concluded that there was no practical possibility of negotiating a detailed agreement within any reasonable period of time. Therefore he decided, on June 7, to submit to the parties his own draft of the terms of the truce, requesting the parties to accept the proposal (**S/829**). Regarding the entry of men of military age, his interpretation was that the resolution did not prohibit Immigration, therefore decided that free immigration of women and children and men under and above the age group of 18 to 45 should be permitted. In addition, a limited number of men of military age were to be permitted to enter, the number to be at the discretion of the Mediator and these men to be kept in non-military camps under the surveillance of United Nations observers during the period of the truce. At the 314th meeting of the Council on June 7, **the representative of the U.S.S.R. asked for clarification of the procedure to be adopted for providing the Mediator with military observers in accordance with paragraph 7 of the resolution of May 29. The U.S.S.R. was prepared to send observers to Palestine together with other Powers directly concerned. Then the representative of the U.S.S.R. expressed the view that the question was not one of interpretation to be left to the Mediator.**

On June 10, the representative of the United States stated that in his opinion it was the intent of the resolution of May 29 that the Mediator should be left free to make his own arrangements in respect of the truce and its supervision. He would, however, accept any decision which the Council might make. **The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. stated he did not see how the seventh paragraph of the resolution of May 29 could be interpreted to mean that only States members of the Truce Commission should send military observers.**

At the 320th meeting of the Council on June 15, **the representative of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following draft resolution (S/841): "Considering the necessity of providing the United Nations Mediator in Palestine with an appropriate number of military observers in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 29 May 1948, "The Security Council resolves: 1. To attach to the United Nations Mediator military observers numbering from thirty to fifty persons. 2. The military observers should be appointed by Member States of the Security Council wishing to participate in the designation of such observers, excluding Syria."** The Council rejected the U.S.S.R. draft resolution by 2 votes in favor (Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.), with 9 abstentions.

A cablegram from the Mediator dated June 15 (**S/839**) informing the Council that in his view the truce had worked well during the first few days, taking into account all circumstances, including difficulties encountered regarding communications and getting observers to strategic points and fronts in time. Later on another message (**S/840**) came in and contained a request that the Council call on all Member States, and on some non-member states, to report on the steps taken to implement the resolution of May 29, and urge all states to assist the Mediator in the implementation of the truce proposals. After brief discussion the Council agreed to the Mediator's requests. Replies (**S/855, Add.1-4**) and brought to the attention of the States Members and non-members of the United Nations by the Secretary General, were received from: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Union of South Africa, United States.

On June 30, 1948, the Mediator informed the Security Council by cablegram (**S/860**) that as a result of consultations with representatives of the parties he had, on June 28 and 29 presented different suggestions (**S/863**). Both parties rejected the Mediator's proposals (**S/863**) as a basis of discussion. In its reply (**S/-870**) the Provisional Government of Israel stated that the proposals ignored the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, as well as the outstanding fact of the situation, namely the effective establishment of the sovereignty of the State of Israel within the area assigned to it by the General Assembly's resolution.

The Security Council's resolution of May 29, was due to expire on July 9. So they presented the possibility of a prolongation of the truce since the mediator alleged the violations and the fighting on a major scale had been stopped and neither side had gained any significant military advantage from the application of the truce despite the violations of the terms of the truce agreement. The Security Council considered the Mediator's request at its 330th and 331st meetings on July 7. At the 330th meeting on July 7, the President, in his invitation to representatives of the interested parties to take their seats at the Council table, included, among others, the "representative of the

State of Israel". They voted and only five members were in favor (Belgium, Canada, China, Syria, United Kingdom) the president therefore declared his ruling sustained. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council could not ignore the Mediator's request. He urged immediate action by the Council in view of the early expiration of the truce. He submitted a draft resolution **(S/867)**. Later on the representative of the United States stated that the Council must support the truce. The representative of Syria brought to the attention of the Council his Government's note referring to the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and Israel during the period of the truce. The representative of Syria stated that if such actions, which he considered to be a violation of the truce agreement and the resolution of May 29, were to continue, then the prolongation of the truce period would not be of great use.

**At the 331st meeting on July 7, the representative of the U.S.S.R. stated that, in considering the possibility of prolongation of the truce, the Council must examine the suggestions which the Mediator had presented to the parties on June 28 (S/863) and which he considered violated the General Assembly's decision of November 29, 1947. In making these suggestions, he said, the Mediator, instead of contributing to a peaceful settlement, was encouraging the prolongation of the fighting and was interfering with the establishment of two independent states in Palestine. The proposed arrangements for the enlargement of Transjordan, through annexation of a part of Palestine to its territory, the infringement of the sovereignty of the Jewish State in the fields of foreign policy and defense, together with various other suggestions for territorial and constitutional changes with regard to Jerusalem, Western Galilee, and the Negeb, violated the Assembly's decision and undermined the authority of the United Nations. The U.S.S.R. delegation supported prolongation of the truce, but could not accede to the conditions attached to it. The President, speaking as the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R., said that in considering the United Kingdom proposal, one had to ask oneself to what end the present truce was being contemplated. A study of the proposals submitted by the Mediator provided ample answer to that question. Those proposals were aimed at the establishment of one federal state instead of two independent and sovereign states. Jerusalem, which should have been given an international status, was to be handed to the Arabs, and Transjordan was to be a component part of Palestine. All such schemes presented by the Mediator were harmful to the interests of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, as well as to the interests of other Arab States of the Middle East, and were designed to safeguard the strategic, political and economic interests of certain Powers, particularly the United Kingdom. For these reasons, the delegation of the Ukrainian S.S.R., although favoring a truce, was unable to vote for the draft resolution and would abstain. The United Kingdom draft resolution (S/867) was then adopted by 8 votes in favor, with 3 abstentions (Syria, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.)**

By a telegram dated July 9 **(S/876)** the Mediator transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of the reply of the Political Committee of the League of Arab States to the Mediator's proposal **(S/865) for a prolongation of the truce. A prolongation of the truce in this manner would be detrimental to the Arab majority of Palestine.** The communication from the Political Committee of the Arab League concluded that all these factors made it imperative for the Arab States not to agree to a prolongation of the truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to an end. **The Mediator sent a further appeal (S/878) to all parties for a ten-day extension of the truce. The Provisional Government of Israel accepted the new cease-fire proposal and informed the Mediator (S/884) that it was ready to issue** the necessary orders as soon as it was notified by the Mediator that the proposal had been accepted by the Arab Governments and authorities concerned. No reply to the Mediator's appeal for a ten-day cease-fire was received from the Arab States.

At the 333rd meeting on July 13, the United Nations Mediator made an oral statement explaining and amplifying a written report **(S/888)** which he had **on July 12 submitted to the Council, concerning his activities in connection with the truce and his negotiations for the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.** The representative of the United States said that the report submitted by the Mediator and the renewal of the hostilities made it imperative for the Council to take immediate action to stop the fighting. To that end he submitted the following draft resolution **(S/890)** which was voted by paragraph after days of discussion by the members of the Council. The amended United States resolution **(S/902)** as a whole was then adopted on July 15, 1948, by a vote of 7 to 1 (Syria), with 3 abstentions (Argentina, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.)

August 13 the Council decided, by a vote of 8 to 1, with 2 abstentions, to authorize the President to dispatch a message to the Mediator informing him that the Security Council had taken note of the telegram of August 12, **concerning the destruction of the water pumping station at Latrun, and asking him to make all efforts and take steps to ensure water supply to the population of Jerusalem.**

At the 354th meeting on August 19, **the Council examined a cable dated August 18 from the Mediator (S/977), which stated, inter alia, that not only had firing practically never ceased in Jerusalem, but the situation there was gradually getting out of hand, ignoring the authority of the United Nations.** In connection with this cable from the Mediator, the representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly introduced a draft resolution **(S/981).** **The representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. stated that he could not see much point in adopting the draft resolution. The Mediator's cable, he declared, showed the failure of that United Nations official. The present draft resolution would not change matters greatly.**

On August 30 by the President to consider a communication **(S/985)** from the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel, requesting an interpretation of sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of the resolution adopted on August 19. After an exchange of views, the Council failed to adopt the agenda, only two members (U.S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R.) voting in favor, the remaining nine members abstaining on the ground that the agenda did not warrant emergency consideration. **Before the meeting was adjourned, the Council was informed that two French observers in Palestine had been killed at Gaza (Palestine) on August 28.** The representative of the United Kingdom considered that the situation was particularly urgent. As a first step, he therefore suggested that the Council ask the International Red

Cross to send a small party at once to Palestine and the neighboring Arab States to examine the scope of the problem and formulate recommendations.

**Later on September 17, 1948, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte, and United Nations Observer Colonel André Serot (France) were assassinated in a part of the City of Jerusalem which was under Jewish control.** The representative of Argentina proposed the following draft resolution (see **S/P.V.358**), which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council.

On September 30th the acting mediator sent a cablegram describing the more violent situation, and the process that both parties cooperated in the Truce Commission but outside they placed obstacles between each other (**S/1022**), various reports including this of the Acting mediator were considered, one regarding the assassination of the Mediator (**S/1018**) and one from the Chairman of the Truce commission regarding Jewish actions against resolution 54 regarding Jerusalem. (**S/1023**) . The Acting mediator stated to the council that further action against the truce or to the arrangements made through the commission should be considered under Ch VII since the parties had failed to comply with the truce conditions. China and the UK prepared a draft resolution (S/1032) that passed unanimously as Resolution 59 **with the oral amendment of USSR.**

On the same meeting of October 19th reports regarding attacks between Israel and Egypt were considered by the Council, the communications were sent by the Acting mediator (**S/1042**), the Provisional government of Israel (**S/1043**) and the Foreign Minister of Egypt (**S/1038 S/1041**), the reports stated that attacks between Israel and Egypt had taken place and that the violence in the region of Negeb had intensified. The Acting mediator stated that the problem was that the appeal for a negotiation had been accepted but that the Israel government had rejected to a ceasefire, and that a ceasefire should be part of the negotiation. After the adoption of several requests of the Acting mediator new communications of conflict were considered by the council from October 22nd towards October 26th.

On October 28th the Acting mediator established that the proceeding and provisional lines for the withdrawal were given (**S/1058**), and established that the Israeli provisional government sent a reply (**S/1057**) that the status quo ante was negotiable according to the Councils interpretation, thus this was not an absolute mandate or injunction. So the Acting mediator called the Council for immediate action since it was necessary for strengthening the truce. China and the UK introduced a proposal to support the truce through article 41. controversy regarding the meaning of the measures of Resolution 59 was considered since the parties had doubts and differed on its interpretation, so the **USSR stated that resolution 59 was a hasty decision by the council and to take another hasty decision without a deep understanding of the scope of resolution 59 will prove these new measure useless, thus these measures had to take into consideration the needs of the parties . The Ukrainian SSR proposed to give to days for the consideration of the resolution so measures can be taken, the motion did not pass.** A Revised version was presented but Canada proposed another one that proposed a committee to consider amendments and further revisions and to work with the Acting mediator for a final draft.

Then on November 4th Belgium proposed a draft that was amended by USA and Ukraine SSR proposed another one. Israel said he liked Ukraine resolution and the other ones liked the Belgian one with the USA amendment, Syria stated that they could accept the Ukraine draft since the behavior of Ukraine when it was president of the Council was unacceptable. Then Resolution 61 was adopted.

On November 9 and 10 the Council held meetings at the request of the Acting mediator for the transition of the truce to a permanent peace agreement. On November 10th USSR through a proposal stated that to begin firstly that the parties should negotiate directly and through a third party. Second he proposed that the negotiations were for a formal peace instead of an armistice. Finally, the USSR representative proposed the deletion of the provision for broad demilitarized zones and the withdrawal and reduction of the armed forces of the parties concerned.

On November 15th discussion was resumed. France, Belgium and Canada made a draft that was more alike the considerations the Acting mediator stated previously. Israel considered that the French proposal made a prejudice to the negotiation, that the armistice and the fact that there should be a distinction between the armistice itself and the implementation, according to Israel the armistice should be decreed by the Council and the implementation should be negotiated. The Arabs refused themselves to direct negotiation and stated that they will only accept the mediation of UN, furthermore Syria stated that they will not drop their claims and will not recognize Israel.

Egypt sent communications on December 23rd and 24th, stating that Israel attacked him, and asked for an special session, On December 28 the council met and considered the Egyptian communications and the reports of the Action Mediator Stating that he could not longer report the situation in Negeb since the Observers were being refused of access to the area. Egypt stated that the Jews attacked by dropping resolution 61 previous to the adoption of Egypt of resolution 62, Israel said that Egypt was just assuming the responsibilities that were favorable to them. And Belgium and France stated that the implementation of one resolution depended on the resolution of the other. The discussion continued until in December 29th the Council adopted resolution 66

# Soviet Speech in the GA for the Partition plan

Monday, September 05, 2011  
6:49 PM

Mr. Gromyko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as everyone knows, **has had no direct material or other interests in Palestine; it is interested in the question of Palestine because it is a Member of the United Nations and because it is a great Power that bears, just as do other great Powers, a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace.** These facts determine the stand taken by the Government of the USSR on the question of Palestine. The views of the delegation of the USSR have already been expressed fully enough at the special session of the General Assembly, in May 1947, as well as in the course of the debates during the present session. I shall not, therefore, repeat what has already been stated earlier by the USSR delegation when the question of the future of Palestine was being considered. But I believe that a few additional remarks will not be useless, in view of the fact that the General Assembly at this or a following meeting will have to take a momentous decision that will decide the future of Palestine. It is natural, therefore, for every delegation to regard it as a duty not only to take up a definite position by voting for a particular proposal but also to give reasons for the stand it takes.

When the question of the future of Palestine was under discussion at the special session of the General Assembly, the Government of the USSR pointed to the two most acceptable solutions of this question. **The first was the creation of a single democratic Arab-Jewish State in which Arabs and Jews would enjoy equal rights. In case that solution were to prove unworkable because of Arab and Jewish insistence that, in view of the deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations, they would be unable to live together, the Government of the USSR through its delegation at the Assembly, pointed to the second solution, which was to partition Palestine into two free, independent and democratic States—an Arab and a Jewish one.**

The special session of the General Assembly, as you know, set up a Special Committee on Palestine which carefully studied the question of Palestine in order to find the most acceptable solution. After the work of this Committee had been completed, we were gratified to find that its recommendation, or to be more exact, the recommendation of the majority of the Committee, coincided with one of the two solutions advanced by the USSR delegation at the special session. I have in mind the solution of partitioning Palestine into two independent democratic States—an Arab and a Jewish one.

**The USSR delegation, therefore, could not but support this alternative which was recommended by the Special Committee.** We now know that not only did the Special Committee which studied the problem of the future of Palestine accept the alternative of partition, but that this proposal gained the support of an overwhelming majority of the other delegations represented in the General Assembly. **The overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations reached the same conclusion as had been reached by the USSR Government after a comprehensive study**

**of the question how the problem of the future of Palestine should be resolved.**

**We may ask why it is that the overwhelming majority of the delegations represented in the General Assembly adopted this solution and not another. The only explanation that can be given is that all the alternative solutions of the Palestinian problem were found to be unworkable and impractical.** In stating this, I have in mind the project of creating a single independent Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. The experience gained from the study of the Palestinian question, including the experience of the Special Committee, has shown that **Jews and Arabs in Palestine do not wish or are unable to live together.** The logical conclusion followed that, if these two peoples that inhabit Palestine, both of which have deeply rooted historical ties with the land, cannot live together within the boundaries of a single State, **there is no alternative but to create, in place of one country, two States—an Arab and a Jewish one. It is, in the view of our delegation, the only workable solution.**

**The opponents of the partition of Palestine into two separate, independent, democratic States usually point to the fact that this decision would, as they allege, be directed against the Arabs,** against the Arab population in Palestine and against the Arab States in general. This point of view is, for reasons that will be readily understood, particularly emphasized by the delegations of the Arab countries. But the USSR delegation cannot concur in this view. Neither the proposal to partition Palestine into two separate, independent States nor the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee that was created at that session and which approved the proposal which is now under discussion, is directed against the Arabs. This decision is not directed against either of the two national groups that inhabit Palestine. On the contrary, **the USSR delegation holds that this decision corresponds to the fundamental national interests of both peoples, that is to say, to the interests of the Arabs as well as of the Jews.**

The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition of Palestine would be an historic injustice. But this view of the case is unacceptable, if only because, after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with Palestine for a considerable period in history. Apart from that, we must not overlook—and the USSR delegation drew attention to this circumstance originally at the special session of the General Assembly—we must not overlook the position in which the Jewish people found themselves as a result of the recent world war. I shall not repeat what the USSR delegation said on this point at the special session of the General Assembly.

However, it may not be amiss to remind my listeners again that, as a result of the war which was unleashed by Hitlerite Germany, the Jews, as a people, have suffered more than any other people. **You know that there was not a single country in Western Europe which succeeded in adequately protecting the interests of the Jewish people against the arbitrary acts and violence of the Hitlerites.**

In connexion with the proposal to partition Palestine, the representatives of some Arab States referred to the USSR and attempted to cast

aspersions on the foreign policy of its Government. In particular, the representative of Lebanon twice exercised his ingenuity on the subject. I **have already pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine into two separate independent States, and the position which the USSR has taken in this matter, are not directed against the Arabs, and that, in our profound conviction, such a solution of this question is in keeping with the basic national interests not only of the Jews but also of the Arabs.**

The Government and the peoples of the USSR have entertained and still entertain a feeling of sympathy for the national aspirations of the nations of the Arab East. **The USSR's attitude towards the efforts of these peoples to rid themselves of the last fetters of colonial dependence is one of understanding and sympathy.** Therefore, we do not identify with the vital national interests of the Arabs the clumsy statements made by some of the representatives of Arab States about the foreign policy of the USSR in connexion with the question of the future of Palestine. We draw a distinction between such statements, which were obviously made under the stress of fleeting emotions, and the basic and permanent interests of the Arab people. The USSR delegation is convinced that Arabs and the Arab States will still, on more than one occasion, be looking towards Moscow and expecting the USSR to help them in the struggle for their lawful interests, in their efforts to cast off the last vestiges of foreign dependence.

The delegation of the USSR maintains that the decision to partition Palestine is in keeping with the high principles and aims of the United Nations. It is in keeping with the principle of the national self-determination of peoples. **The policy of the USSR in the sphere of Nationality problems, which has been pursued ever since its creation, is a policy of friendship and self-determination of peoples. That is why all the nationalities that inhabit the USSR represent a single united family that has survived desperate trials during the war years in its fight against the most powerful and most dangerous enemy that a peace-loving people has ever met.**

The solution of the Palestine problem based on a partition of Palestine into two separate states will be of profound historical significance, because this decision will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whom, as you know, are still without a country, without homes, having found temporary shelter only in special camps in some western European countries. **I shall not speak of the conditions in which these people are living; these conditions are well known.**

Quite a lot has been said on this subject by representatives who share the USSR delegation's point of view in this matter, and which support the plan for partitioning Palestine into two States.

The Assembly is making a determined effort to find the most equitable, most practical, most workable and at the same time the most radical solution to the Palestine problem. In doing so, the Assembly bases itself on certain irrefutable facts which led to the Palestinian question being raised in the United Nations. What are these facts? **Fact number one is that the mandate system has been found wanting. I shall say more: the mandate system has failed. That the mandate system has failed we know even from the statements of the United Kingdom representatives. These statements were made at the special session as well as at the present ses-**

sion of the Assembly. It was just because the system of governing Palestine by mandate had failed, had proved inadequate, that the United Kingdom Government turned to the United Nations for help. The United Kingdom asked the Assembly to take the appropriate decision and thus to undertake itself the settlement of the problem of the future of Palestine.

**Fact number two: the United Kingdom Government, having turned to the United Nations, stated that it could not be responsible for implementing all the measures which will have to be put into effect in Palestine in connexion with a possible decision of the General Assembly. In so doing, the United Kingdom Government has recognized that the General Assembly can, by virtue of the rights and powers conferred upon it by the Charter, assume responsibility for settling the question of the future of Palestine.**

The USSR delegation considers it advisable, nevertheless, to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that up to now **the Assembly has not been getting from the United Kingdom the kind of support which we have the right to expect.** On the one hand, the United Kingdom Government has applied to the Assembly for help in settling the question of the future of Palestine; on the other hand, **the United Kingdom Government during the discussion of the question at the special session as well as during the current session of the Assembly, has entered so many reservations that willy-nilly one asks oneself whether the United Kingdom is really anxious to have the Palestinian problem settled through the United Nations.** At the special session of the General Assembly, **the United Kingdom representative, on the one hand, declared that the United Kingdom is prepared to implement the United Nations decisions, provided that the responsibility for the action that would possibly have to be taken did not rest with the United Kingdom alone.** By this declaration, the United Kingdom delegation made it unequivocally clear to the other States that it was prepared to cooperate with the United Nations in the solution of this problem.

On the other hand, however, at that same special session, **the United Kingdom representative stated that his Government was prepared to give effect to the relevant decisions of the General Assembly only if the Arabs and Jews agreed on some kind of a solution of the problem. It will be clear to everyone that these two statements contradict each other.** If the first statement shows the readiness of the United Kingdom to cooperate with the United Nations in this matter, the second statement shows that the United Kingdom Government may disregard the Assembly's decision. Similar reservations have been made by the United Kingdom representative during the present session. We have heard, today, Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement on this matter. He repeated in a slightly modified form the idea that the United Kingdom was prepared to implement the Assembly's decision provided the Jews and the Arabs came to an agreement. **But we all know that the Arabs and the Jews have failed to reach an agreement.**

The discussion of this problem at the present session shows that an agreement between them is impossible. There seems to be no prospect of any such agreement being reached between Arabs and Jews.

This is the opinion not only of the USSR delegation but of all those delegations that have come to the conclusion that a definitive decision on this question must be reached during the present session.

**All these reservations by the United Kingdom delegation show that the United Kingdom has no real desire, even now, to cooperate fully with the United Nations in solving this problem.** While the vast majority of the delegations represented at the General Assembly were in favour of reaching forthwith a definite decision on the question of the future of Palestine, in favour of partitioning Palestine into two States, the United Kingdom Government declares that it will comply with the Assembly decision only when the Jews and the Arabs agree between themselves. I repeat that to put forward such a stipulation is almost tantamount to burying this decision even before the General Assembly has taken it. Is that how the United Kingdom should behave in this matter, especially now, when, after lengthy discussion, it has become clear to everyone, including the United Kingdom, that the overwhelming majority of countries are in favour of partitioning Palestine?

In the course of the first session in which the question of the future of Palestine first arose, it was still possible, at least to understand the reservations made by the United Kingdom delegation. But now, after the views of the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Members have become clear, **the lodging of such reservations is tantamount to stating in advance that the United Kingdom does not consider itself bound by any solution the General Assembly may adopt.**

**The USSR delegation cannot share this view. We have a right to expect the cooperation of the United Kingdom in this matter.** We have a right to expect that, should the Assembly adopt a certain recommendation, the United Kingdom will take that recommendation into account, especially since the present regime in Palestine is hated equally by both Arab and Jew. You all know what the attitude towards that regime is, especially on the part of the Jews.

I think I should also mention yet another aspect.

From the very outset of these discussions, a number of delegations, mainly the delegations of Arab States, have tried to convince us that this question was ostensibly not within the competence of the United Nations. In so claiming they were unable, as might have been expected, to adduce any convincing arguments apart from various general and unfounded statements and declarations.

The General Assembly, as well as the United Nations as a whole, not only has a right to consider this matter, but in view of the situation that has arisen in Palestine, it is bound to take the requisite decision. **In the view of the USSR delegation, the plan for the solution of the Palestinian problem which has been drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee, and according to which the practical implementation of the measures necessary to give it effect rests with the Security Council, is in full accord with the interest of maintaining and strengthening international peace and with the interest of increasing cooperation between States.** It is precisely for this reason that the USSR delegation supports the recommendation to partition Palestine.

The USSR delegation, unlike some other delegations, has from the outset taken a clear-cut, definite and unequivocal stand in this matter. It is consistently maintaining this stand. It has no intention of maneuvering and manipulating votes as unfortunately is done at the Assembly, especially in connexion with the consideration of the Palestinian question.

# Time line

Saturday, September 24, 2011

5:00 PM

November 29 1947 Partition plan - creation of the UNPC  
December 2 1947 letter of the SG regarding the referral of the GA of resolution 181(II)  
January 31 of 1948 First monthly report of the UNPC S/663  
February 10th start of the Debate on the Model.  
February 16th First special report of the UNPC S/676  
March 5 resolution 42 of the SC  
March 15 second report of the UNPC - S/695  
March 19 Report on the consultations between the P5 - S/PV.270  
April 1st resolutions 43 and 44 of the SC -the Council calls for the GA special session  
April 16th start of the Second Special session of the GA  
April 17 resolution 46 SC  
April 23 resolution 48 of the SC - Truce Commission  
April 29 186 (S-2) of the GA - Mediator  
May 1st Cablegram from the Jewish agency reporting Arab invasion S/730  
May 6 resolution 187 (S-2) of the GA - Another Jewish communication of Arab aggression S/736  
May 7th letter of the Jewish Agency to the SC S/738  
May 12 letter of the Truce commission to the Council S/741(dated may 9)and S/742 (dated may 10)  
May 14 creation of the State of Israel and recognition by USSR - end of the Second Special Session  
May 15 Egypt enters Palestine S/743 and the Arab League stands against Israel S/745  
May 16 Transjordan enters Palestine S/748  
May 29 resolution 50 of the SC  
July 7 resolution 53 of the SC  
July 14 resolution 54 of the SC  
August 19 resolution 56 of the SC  
September 16 Report of the Mediator A/648  
September 17th death of the Mediator in Jerusalem.  
September 21st Start of the third regular session of the GA(it ended on May 1949)  
October 19 resolution 59 of the SC  
October 29 resolution 60 of the SC  
November 4 resolution 61 of the SC  
November 16 resolution 62 of the SC  
December 11 resolution 194(III) GA - Conciliation Commission  
December 29 resolution 66 and SC last meeting of the year regarding Palestine

## Soviet Position regarding Second Special Session 16apr-may14.

Saturday, September 24, 2011  
5:00 PM

They understood that the 181(II) resolution was not perfect but it was the fairest and most equitable solution for the problem, furthermore they established that it was clear the main problem for implementation was the need of a implementation machinery to make the work, and that the absence of such was the main setback for the implementation. They thought that USA and the UK were trying to wreck the partition plan by placing their own selfish interests ahead of the interests of the Palestinian population. Nevertheless the resolution should be maintained and implemented and the setbacks should be overthrown.

Regarding the Situation in Jerusalem the USSR supported the proposal of Poland to create a sub-committee of the First committee of the GA to address the situation and submit its proposals in 10 days. At the end the trusteeship council proposal won and the recommendations were unacceptable to the USSR. The USSR delegation rejected the report of Subcommittee 10(after the appointment of Mr. Harold Evans as Special Municipal Commissioner) regarding the use of Trusteeship for an interim administration of Jerusalem.

The USSR considered that the appointment of a Mediator was pointless since one of the states that was going to be created through the implementation of resolution 181, had been created recently (Israel). And even if adopted the resolution adopted by the first committee could not affect the validity of the partition plan. The USSR will then vote against the mediator resolution. (Cuba said that there was no reason for a vote on the resolution since its sponsor had just recognized Israel).

# Soviet Position in the Third General Assembly Sept 21 1948 - May 18 1949

Monday, September 26, 2011  
1:09 PM

On November 22 the representative of the USSR considered the report of the Mediator (A/648) to be contradictory to resolution 181. He then proposed a draft resolution(A/C.1/401) recommending the immediate removal of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel. Furthermore they stated that accepting and promoting resolution 181 was the rightful and equitable solution to both parties, since they both deserved self determination, and blamed the Assembly of falling into the interests of UK and USA by accepting the creation of the Mediator. And the mediator had went beyond its terms of reference instead of staying inside them and enforcing a truce and looking for a permanent peaceful settlement. Those in favor of the Soviet proposal also stated that they could support to annex the Arab territory of resolution 181 to Transjordan since it was controlled by UK thus it will be delivering the territory to UK, they specially rejected giving Negeb. They alleged that the UK and the USA worked to wreck the 181 resolution, and that this had led to the military operation being carried out in Palestine, they also alleged that the mediator's proposals were in the interests of UK and USA and that the implementation of the resolution 181 corresponded to the right of self determination of both Arabs and Jews.

They alleged that the resolution was a milestone of international relations since it was supported by the USA and the USSR, proving that international cooperation was possible, the possibility of the resolution was confirmed by the creation of Israel in the territory established to it in the 181 resolution, but that the Work of the Commission of the resolution was prevented to come into force from the moment the Mandate Ended and the Arabs entered into Palestine through force.

They stated that the 181 resolution should be the starting point for the settlement of the situation and that the mediators proposals should not replace them since the resolution gave both parties what they wanted, to the Jews a Home, and to the Arabs liberation from the colonial power. How ever they believed that problems could be solved through direct negotiation, namely economic union, demarcation of the borders and coop between the states. Naturally they claimed for the creation of an Arab State since it was the last difficult objective remaining of the 181 resolution.

They considered that the conciliation commission should not be independent and that the GA should guide the policies it should adopt. They stated that the withdrawal of troops was necessary since in the presence of those troops the suffering of the population emerged and they were an obstacle to a lasting peace initiative, they also condemned the help UK was giving to Transjordan. And so they declared that the UK's proposal(A/C.1/394/Rev.2) was directed toward the aims of confusing the Assembly.

# Meetings

Friday, September 30, 2011

12:45 PM

## Security Council Meetings:

### February Presidency – Canada

S/PV.243 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 10 February 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.253 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 24 February 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.254 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 24 February 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.255 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 25 February 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.258 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 27 February 1948, at 3 p.m.)

### March Presidency – Republic of China

S/PV.260 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 2 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.261 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 3 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.262 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 5 March 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.263 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 5 March 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
Resolution 42 (1948) of 5 March 1948  
S/PV.267 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 16 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.269 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 18 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.270 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 19 March 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.271 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 19 March 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.274 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 24 March 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.275 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 30 March 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)

### April Presidency – Republic of Colombia

S/PV.277 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 1 April 1948, at 2:30 p.m.)  
Resolution 43 (1948) of 1 April 1948  
Resolution 44 (1948) of 1 April 1948  
S/PV.282 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 15 April 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.283 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 16 April 1948, at 9 p.m.)  
Resolution 46 (1948) of 17 April 1948  
S/PV.287 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 23 April 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
Resolution 48 (1948) of 23 April 1948

### May Presidency - French Fourth Republic

S/PV.289 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 7 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.291 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 12 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.292 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 15 May 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.293 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 17 May 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.294 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 18 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.295 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 18 May 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
Questionnaire, 18 May 1948  
S/PV.296 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 19 May 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.297 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 20 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.298 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 20 May 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.299 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 21 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.301 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 22 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.302 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday 22 May 1948, at 3:30 p.m.)  
Resolution 49 (1948) of 22 May 1948  
S/PV.303 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 24 May 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.305 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 26 May 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.306 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 27 May 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.307 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 28 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.308 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 28 May 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.309 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 29 May 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.310 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 29 May 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
Resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948

### June Presidency – Syrian Arab Republic

S/PV.311 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 2 June 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.313 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 3 June 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.314 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 7 June 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.317 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 10 June 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.320 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 June 1948, at 3 p.m.)

#### July Presidency – Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

S/PV.330 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 7 July 1948, at 11 a.m.)  
S/PV.331 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 7 July 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
Resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948  
S/PV.332 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 8 July 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.333 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 13 July 1948, at 11 a.m.)  
S/PV.334 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 13 July 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.335 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 14 July 1948, at 11 a.m.)  
S/PV.336 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 14 July 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.337 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 15 July 1948, at 11 a.m.)  
S/PV.338 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 15 July 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
Resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948  
S/PV.339 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 27 July 1948, at 11 a.m.)  
S/PV.340 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 27 July 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)

#### August Presidency – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

S/PV.343 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 2 August 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.349 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 13 August 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.352 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 18 August 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)  
S/PV.354 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 19 August 1948, at 3.30 p.m.)  
Resolution 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948  
S/PV.356 (Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 30 August 1948, at 2.30 p.m.)

#### September Presidency – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

S/PV.358 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Saturday, 18 September 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
Resolution 57 (1948) of 18 September 1948

#### October Presidency – United States of America

S/PV.365 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Thursday, 14 October 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.367 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 19 October 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
Resolution 59 (1948) of 19 October 1948  
Statement, 19 October 1948  
S/PV.373 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, On Tuesday, 26 October 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.374 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Thursday, 28 October 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.375 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Friday, 29 October 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
Resolution 60 (1948) of 29 October 1948

#### November Presidency – Republic of Argentina

S/PV.376 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Thursday, 4 November 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.377 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Thursday, 4 November 1948, at 9.30 p.m.)  
Resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948  
S/PV.378 (Held in private at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 9 November 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.379 (Held in private at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Wednesday, 10 November 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.380 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Monday, 15 November 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
S/PV.381 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 16 November 1948, at 10 a.m.)  
Resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948

#### December Presidency – Kingdom of Belgium

S/PV.394 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 28 December 1948, at 10.30 a.m.)  
S/PV.395 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Tuesday, 28 December 1948, at 3.25 p.m.)  
S/PV.396 (Held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Wednesday, 29 December 1948, at 3 p.m.)  
Resolution 66 (1948) of 29 December 1948

Pasted from <<https://www.facebook.com/groups/269975153029651/>>

# Resolutions directly SC

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:36 PM

Resolution 42(March 5 1948): after receiving the UNPC(United Nations Palestine Commission) report , calls the permanent members to consult, inform and make recommendations to the council so they may be sent to the Palestine Commission for the implementation of resolution 181 of the GA. Calls for all governments to help on the prevention of a more wide conflict.

Resolution 43(April 1 1948): calls for the Jewish agency and the Arab High Committee to make representatives available to the Council so that with their presence a truce can be made, and in a way intimidates the parties by remembering them the consequences of not observing such a truce. Calls the parties to cease the acts of violence immediately.

Resolution 44(April 1 1948): uses Article 20 of the charter to call the SG to convoke an Special Session of the General Assembly to further consider the situation in Palestine. **It had 2 abstentions, USSR, Ukraine.**

Resolution 46(April 17 1948): this one has 2 parts,

- Paragraph 1: calls all organizations and parties to take a series of measures to stop the conflict, these included,
  - Refraining from all acts of violence, terrorism, or sabotage
  - The importation of weaponry and war materials
  - Refrain from allowing the entrance of other armed groups into the region and into the conflict, whatever their origins were.
  - To prevent damaging the religious places
  - Cooperate with the authorities that carried the mandate in the maintenance of order and the rule of law.

It also stated that UK, since it was still the mandatory power, had the primary responsibility to apply the measures of paragraph 1 and to make all of the parties concerned to also accept this measures. UK was to report the progress of this resolution to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Resolution also called for all governments, particularly those who where neighboring countries, to cooperate and help in the implementation of the measures of paragraph 1 specially those referring to the armed groups and the war material. **It had 2 Abstentions, USSR and Ukraine.**

Resolution 48(April 23 1948): This resolution established a **Truce Commission for Palestine** which was composed of all members of the council who had career consular officers in Jerusalem,(**Syria stated that it was not prepared to serve the commission**) the purpose of the commission will be the supervision of the implementation of the measures of resolution 46. The commission was to report to the president of the Security Council within 4 days regarding its progress and to maintain the Council informed of the situation. The SG will aid the commission and its members with the personnel they request since the situation in Palestine is quite urgent. **It had 3 abstentions Colombia, USSR and Ukraine.**

Resolution 49(May 22 1948): It called for all parties and governments, to abstain from any military hostile action in Palestine, and so they must issue a cease fire order to become effective 36 hours after the resolution was adopted. The Truce commission of resolution 48 was to give highest priority to work over the maintenance of a Truce in the City of Jerusalem and to report about the Truce and the ceasefire to the Council. Calls upon all parties to help and facilitate the work of the Special Mediator of resolution 186(S-2) of the GA. **It had 3 abstentions Syria, USSR and Ukraine.**

Resolution 50(May 29 1948): it called for a ceasefire to all the Arab Nations involved and all other parties involved for a period of four weeks. It also called that the Arab Nations should not introduce more military personnel into the region. The UN special Mediator and the Truce Commission to

supervise the observance of the ceasefire and the military personnel restriction, and to do so they will be given a series of military observers. The Mediator was to continue with its task once the ceasefire was in force with weekly reports to the council. The last part stated that the parties to the conflict shall make a declaration accepting the resolution no later than 6pm N.Y. Standard Time of June 1st 1948, if they didn't accept or violated the provision after accepting it, the situation will be addressed through Chapter VII.(the observers given to the Mediator are the UNTSO)

Resolution 53(July 7 1948): It called the parties to accept the prolongation of the Truce that was requested by the Special Mediator, since they received a Telegram from the Mediator on July 5. **It had 3 Abstentions Syria, USSR and Ukraine**

Resolution 54(July 15 1948): This resolutions is adopted since the Jews did accept immediately the truce extension and the Arabs rejected various appeals of the Special Mediator regarding resolution 53, and since the acceptance of a truce was a requisite to do not use Chapter VII, the council decided that the situation entered into the range of article 39(chapter VII) since there was a renewal of hostilities in the region. It calls once again to parties concerned to issue a ceasefire, this was a provisional measure under Article 40. the duration of the ceasefire was to be determined by the Special Mediator but the issuing of the ceasefire could not be later than three days from the adoption of the resolution. The failure to accept the provisional measures will make the Council to enforce Chapter VII fully. The Truce commission was to take on the supervision of an special and highly needed truce/ceasefire for the City of Jerusalem and to take all the measures that were necessary, furthermore the Mediator was to look forward for the demilitarization of Jerusalem, The mediator was to deal with the breaches as it could, using "appropriate local action" and to report to the council on its progress, on its Duties the mediator was to have the support of the governments and the parties. It extends the truce of Resolution 50 until a peaceful solution is achieved or if the Council or the Assembly decide that it is no longer necessary. The SG was to make the arrangements for the funding of the operation. **It had 1 against Syria and 3 Abstentions Argentina, USSR and Ukraine.**

Resolution 56(August 19, 1948): from now on Each recognized party will be held responsible of regular and irregular forces under its command, and was also responsible to prevent by all means an offense to the Truce. There can be no gain of territory or political advantage, neither reprisals will be accepted through a violation to the truce, governments should hasten the prosecution of any individual under their jurisdiction that its related to a violation or offense to the truce.

Resolution 59(October 19 1948): the mediator got killed on September 17, and the Provisional Government of Israel to the date had not submitted any reports to the Council or the Acting mediator, So it calls for a report on the situation and why it was so late to arrive. It recalls the obligations of resolutions 54 and 56 are to be met with good faith. Finally it calls for cooperation in all areas, from transport to access and clearances and to increase security for the Acting mediator, and to punish all those that threaten the Mediator.

Resolution 60(October 29 1948): It creates a subcommittee to consider all revision and amendments to draft resolution S/1059/Rev.2 and to create a final version in consultation with the Acting mediator. The countries were UK, Belgium, China, France, and Ukraine.

Resolution 61(November 4 1948): it calls for withdrawal of forces behind provisional lines that were to be drawn by the mediator where no movement of troops will take place. And then to establish the final truce lines, neutral or demilitarized zones as it deems necessary through negotiations or intermediaries of the UN, if the negotiation fails, the lines are set by the Mediator. Appoints a subcommittee to advise the mediator on its responsibilities under this resolution that was conformed by the P5, Belgium and Colombia. This committee will also report the Council on the measures to be taken under Chapter VII, if the negotiations, lines and withdrawals were not accepted or implemented by the parties under the conditions of the Mediator. **It had 1 against Ukraine and 1 abstention USSR.**

Resolution 62 (November 16 1948): It Decided that to eliminate the threat to peace from Palestine an Armistice shall be established, so the transition from the truce to permanent peace is achieved. It calls parties that through another provisional measure under article 40 of the charter they should negotiate directly or through the mediator to establish the armistice, and also to reinforce the armistice conditions in this negotiations, permanent Armistice lines should be established so no armed force can move beyond them and a Disarm and withdrawal of forces so the maintenance of the armistice is sustainable.

Resolution 66(December 29 1948): After another renewal of hostilities, another ceasefire call was issued by the council, a recalling for resolution 61, and a calling for the committee of the same resolution to meet at Lake Success on January 7 to discuss the question of Palestine. And hopes the Conciliation Commission of the GA begins to work as soon as possible.

**Note:** For subsequent messages from the Truce Commission to the Security Council see S/757, S/758, S/817, S/900 on the general situation; S/759, S/761, S/762, S/763, S/764, S/765, S/776, S/777, S/785, S/793, S/797/Corr.1, S/800, S/802, S/808, S/816, S/824, S/891, S/915, S/938 on the situation in Jerusalem; S/771/Add.1 reporting shooting of Thomas Wasson, American member of Truce Commission; S/778 requesting appointment of military advisers to furnish reports on situation in Jerusalem; S/898, S/905, S/915, S/920 on arrest of five British members of Jerusalem Electric Corporation; S/877 and Add.1 on occupancy of King David's Hotel, headquarters of Truce Commission, by Haganah

# Resolutions from other Committees

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:38 PM

## **Resolution 181 GA(November 29 1947):**

- Part A: it adopts the partition plan for Palestine. It gives the Security Council the duty of taking the necessary measures to implement the plan. The Security Council can take the highest authority of the matter, over the GA, if to its consideration there is a threat to international security. The first step if this situation arises is that through articles 39 and 41 to empower the United Nations Palestine Commission of this resolution to exercise its functions properly. Curiously any attempt to alter the partition plan by force the Security Council can consider such an act as a threat, breach to peace or an act of aggression under article 39. It will inform the Trusteeship Council about the inherent responsibilities.
- Part B: Budgetary Questions.

The partition Plan was divided in several parts,

- Part I: Future Constitution and government of Palestine
  - Point A "Termination of Mandate, Partition and Independence": it established that the final date of termination of the mandate is August 1st, the Mandatory Power will retreat its forces progressively and the time limit for total withdrawal in the end of the Mandate (August 1st 1948 even if the British Mandate ends May 15 1948) thus the Mandatory Power will have to cooperate with the Commission, and the area corresponding to the Jewish State should be evacuated (Of British Presence, I suppose) not later than February 1st 1948. After the retreat of the British armed forces, both states and the special international regime will enter into force, in any case this division will enter into force no later than October 1 1948. The Transitional Period will be from the adoption of the recommendations by the GA to the establishment of Independence of both States.
  - Point B "Steps Preparatory to Independence": It establishes a Commission composed by five members elected by the GA, this commission will progressively and transitionally take the place of the Mandatory power during its withdrawal, and UK must cooperate in doing so. As being the new authority, the commission may issue the regulations it deems for the reaching of the plans goal. Their first task is to set the boundaries between both states using the one set on the partition plan and modifying them as necessary, the boundaries will not split villages or rural areas in two unless it is highly necessary. Once the boundaries are established the Commission through consultation with the democratic parties of each state, will establish a Provisional Council of Government on each state, both of them will carry their duties through direction and supervision of the Commission. If by April 1st 1948 there is no Provisional Government then the Commission must notify the Security Council and the SG of the situation and to deal with it. Naturally those provisional governments will have full control of their assigned territories, including immigration and land regulation. Thus after the Mandate ends the Commission will progressively give all power to those Councils. The councils will then form their government structure, form an armed militia from the residents of their respective areas and after the withdrawal from the mandatory forces, an election should be held for a Constituent Assembly (this one is really universal and was for women and men). However the Commission maintains the High command of both militias. During the Transitional period, Jews cannot live in the Arab State and vice versa, unless the commission so approves it. Then after the Constituent Assembly is formed, a draft constitution must be drafted to establish the government that will carry on the work of the councils, the constitution must embody chapters 1 and 2 of part C of the plan, and also provision for civil, political, economical and religious rights, a legislative body that must be elected by secret and universal suffrage. After this the Commission will appoint three members for a preparatory economic commission to implement part D of the plan (the Economic Union). We must highlight that during the termination of the mandate and the withdrawal of the Mandatory forces, the mandatory power maintains responsibility and administration of the areas it has not withdrawn. The actions taken under recommendation of the GA are immediately effective unless the Security Council orders the Commission to do not make it effective. The Commission must report Monthly to the Security Council. The final report of the Commission must be sent to the GA on its next regular session and to the SC simultaneously.
  - Part C "Declaration": after the governments are constituted they must make a declaration to the UN, that is what are we referring in this part. The stipulations of the declaration are basic laws so nothing can collide with them.
    - Chapter 1 "Holy places Religious Buildings and places": it establishes that holy buildings and places are to be of free access to everybody, just as the freedom of belief. That there can be no restriction of access to anyone, even if it is from the other state or if it is an alien. And there can be no taxation over a Holy place that was exempt from taxation on the creation of the State, it states that if a Holy place or building requires repair, the state can ask for help from the affected communities.
    - Chapter 2 "Religious and minority rights": there cannot be any kind of discrimination no matter the grounds, the state may only restrict some religious activities if it is a matter of public order, in any other case the cannot be a measure to do so. Each community has the right to preserve its cultural traditions and can teach with its natural

- language in their schools as long as the educational conditions set by the state are met.
- Chapter 3 "Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations": regarding citizenship after the recognition of independence people will by default have the citizenship of the state it resides on, if the person is over 18 it can opt for citizenship of the other state, but a Jew cannot opt for the citizenship of the Arab state and viceversa. And this includes wife and children under 18. regarding international obligations, both states will be part to all treaties and obligations Palestine was part of, if there is any problem they can make the petition to the ICJ. With the financial obligations is just the same but in this case the obligations that respect to Palestine as a Whole will be made through the Joint economic board, and those who were particular but were problematic are to be addressed by a court of claims, composed of 1 UN member, 1 UK member and a member of the concerned state.
- Chapter 4 "Miscellaneous Provisions": chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration are unchangeable unless the GA so allows it. Any problem with the declaration is to be dealt through the ICJ unless the parties have another way of dealing with the problem.
- Part D "Economic Union and Transit": the part of the Economic Union, was quite revolutionary, to think two different states under a same currency, something like today's UE, however this expanded to areas like development, transit and also to the access to water and power. Then to carry out and make sure the objectives of the Economic Union are met, a Joint Economic Board will be set, by three members if the UN set by ECOSOC and the states concerned, the three set by ECOSOC represent themselves not their government. The states bind themselves to the decisions of the Board. The process of use of the revenues and other programs are set through the Board
- Part E "Assets": In here is that the movable assets have to be distributed equally between the two states and the city of Jerusalem, those that cannot move are part of the state where they are. UK might get something through liquidation of some assets during its withdrawal.
- Part F "Admission to membership in the UN": Once the plan has been established and fulfilled then the state may apply for membership through the conditions of article 4 of the Charter.
- Part II Boundaries
  - The Arab State(not necessary for the Abstract)
  - The Jewish State(not necessary for the Abstract)
  - City of Jerusalem (Defined in Part III)
- Part III City of Jerusalem
  - Part A "Special Regime": they established that Jerusalem will be a *Corpus Separatum* of the other 2 states, under an special administration that will be done by the Trusteeship Council
  - Part B "Boundaries of the City": (not necessary for the Abstract)
  - Part C "Statute of the City": the real statute will be made by the Trusteeship Council and it must present it in a time of 5 months after the approval of the plan. This final Statute must contain the substance of this part of the Plan. Initially it establishes non discrimination and equal rights for its inhabitants, the duty of preserve the Holy places and buildings, furthermore it establishes that the maximum authority in the area, a Governor, that will represent the UN and shall exercise all powers of administration including foreign conduct, the administrative staff the Governor will use must be approved by the Trusteeship Council. If there are other previous autonomous regions, they will have wide powers regarding local government and administration. It is a completely neutral and demilitarized zone, so no regular or irregular forces are allowed. The City of Jerusalem will have a legislative body constituted of its inhabitants regardless of its nationality and the Governor can veto bills that inconsistent with the statute of the city. It will also have a Judicial System and will be part of the Palestine economic Union. Further on the City is described more like a separate state than a city with its own citizenship and boundaries separation. And the same considerations are made regarding the preservation of culture like in Chapter II of Part C of Part I of the plan.
  - Part D "Duration of the Special Regime": the Special Regime should begin no later than October 1st 1948 and in general cases the duration will be ten years if the Trusteeship Council doesn't call a meeting for revision of the regime. When the regime ends then popular expression and referendum will be used to determine the course of the city and also the acquired experience.
- Part IV Capitulations it calls for people with special protection or immunity to renounce to it, so it can be reestablished.

The members of the commission are: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark Panama and Philippines.

**Resolution 186 (S-2) GA(April 29 1948):** it appoints a mediator to take the place of the United Nations Commission for Palestine of resolution 181(II) of the GA, it will have to report monthly to the SC and the SG or earlier if it is necessary, it must cooperate with the United Nations Truce Commission of SC resolution 48. and under its duties are the arrangement of the operation of the services necessary for the well being of the citizens, assure the Holy Places and arrange a peaceful solution for the question.

**Resolution 187(S-2) GA(May 6 1948):** its about the security of the city of Jerusalem, that the GA had already sent a reference to the TC asking to treat that issue in cooperation with the Mandatory power, so the GA accepts and approves the recommendations of the TC that are sent through document A/544. particularly it approves a Special Municipal Commissioner that will replace the Municipal

Commission of Jerusalem, this Special Commissioner will have the duty to work in cooperation with the already existing communities of the city and also those concerned by the situation. Its Commissioner must be someone neutral to both parties. Then it calls the First Committee to this matter, the protection of the city and its habitants.


**Resolution 194(III) of December 11 1948:** establishes a Conciliation Commission to take over the powers of the Mediator as they deem necessary, they will just implement what the resolution says or other things expressly asked to it by the GA or the SC. Those concerned should extend the scope of the negotiations of resolution 62 of the SC, to seek an agreement directly of through the Conciliation Commission. The Commission should assist the governments in such a task. It gives special priority to the Security of Jerusalem and the Security Council should work for the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Calls for the return of refugees to their homes and that the Commission should work to help the refugees to return to their homes. The Commission was composed of Turkey, France and USA.

# Treaties and legal stuff Before UN

Tuesday, August 09, 2011  
10:38 PM

First Part:

Sykes- Picot Agreement 1916: through this initial division



The region of Palestine was inside the Allied Condominium, something like a mixed zone. But at the time and after WWI Britain holds more power in the region than France. The division was made by Russia, UK and France.

Balfour Declaration 1917: the text of the declaration is quite simple, but what matters here is that the letter was sent through the secretary of foreign affairs of UK to the leaders of Zionism there. The text reads as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country "

It must be noted that this declaration comes as a reward for the help that Chaim Weizmann gave the British during WWI. However Balfour knew that the declaration had something wrong and that was that when the League of Nations was established a series of things that were promised in the declaration became unreachable, thus the policy of the UK was letting the Jew Immigration to go towards Palestine and as such the problems restarted.

1919 Paris Conference: **Note to self: Woodrow wilson got sick on the first day of the conference and left the french ambassador, that was a German hater, clear ground to gain international hate towards Germany, so France is the real bastard behind WWII.** This Conference comes to be after Woodrow Wilson stated this 14 points speech, in particular it made possible the armistice between the parties of the war. The Conference ended really bad for Germany. It had a series of products or treaties regarding WWI, and also produced the League of Nations and the system that ruled until WWII that was Versailles-Washington system, regarding the treaties that laid the foundations for the new system. Particulary we will see 2 treaties, the treaty of Sevres that became the Treaty of Laussane since the Ottoman Empire dissolved and became the Turkish Republic. One of the important points was that the Zionist Organization went to the Conference and delivered a statement with five points, furthermore the conference agreed that there should be a new mandate for the arab region, and there was Britain who gained the area. Initially the Jews sent the following points:

- Recognition of the Jewish people's historic title to The Land of Israel and their right to reconstitute their National Home in [Israel](#).
- The boundaries of Israel were to be declared as set out in an attached Schedule.
- The sovereign possession of Israel would be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.
- Other provisions to be inserted by the High Contracting Parties relating to the application of any general conditions attached to mandates, which are suitable to the case in Palestine.
- The mandate shall be subject also to several noted special conditions, including the provision relating to the control of the Holy Places.

Faisal-Weizmann agreement 1919: it was an agreement between King Faisal I and Chaim Weizmann, the agreement was short lived because in the Paris Conference there was no willingness of the British to give independence to the Arabs, what made the Agreement Void. The main points were

- The agreement committed both parties to conducting all relations between the groups by the most cordial goodwill and understanding, to work together to encourage immigration of [Jews](#) into Palestine on a large scale while protecting the rights of the Arab peasants and tenant farmers, and to safeguard the free practice of religious observances. The [Muslim](#) Holy Places were to be under Muslim control.
- The Zionist movement undertook to assist the Arab residents of Palestine and the future Arab state to develop their natural resources and establish a growing economy.
- The boundaries between an Arab State and Palestine should be determined by a Commission after the Paris Peace Conference.
- The parties committed to carrying into effect the [Balfour Declaration of 1917](#), calling for a Jewish national home in Palestine.
- Disputes were to be submitted to the British Government for arbitration.

Treaty of Sevres 1920: Was the Treaty that the Ottoman Empire and the ruling powers of WWI signed at the end of it. It punished The empire quite like Germany in Versailles, in this particular issue we will focus on the part of the geographical divisions. Britain's Hunger for oil gave her the mandate for Palestine through the principles of the Balfour Declaration. Thus the article related to this stated

#### ARTICLE 95.

The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

In this Order Britain got Iraq and Palestine while France got Syria and Lebanon.

Treaty of Lausanne 1923: After the entry into force of the Treaty of Sevres, the Ottoman empire dissolved and the Turkish republic emerged, thus nullifying the treaty, thus a new treaty was made with many differences but, our main subject here didn't change from one treaty to the next, Palestine remained British.

#### Second Part:

Haycraft Commission of Inquiry 1921: it was a Commission that looked for the reason of the riots of 1921, and it concluded that it was of the undermining of the Arab population interests, the conclusions were:

- The British in Palestine, now led by a Zionist, had adopted "a policy mainly directed towards the establishment of a National Home for the Jews, and not to the equal benefit of all Palestinians".
- An official advisory body to the government in Palestine, the Zionist Commission, placed the interests of the Jews above all others.
- There was an undue proportion of Jews in the government.
- Part of the Zionist program was to flood the country with people who possessed "greater commercial and organizing ability" which would eventually lead to their gaining the upper hand over the rest of the population.
- The immigrants were an "economic danger" to the country because of their competition, and because they were favored in this competition.
- Immigrants offended the Arabs "by their arrogance and by their contempt of Arab social prejudices".
- Owing to insufficient precautions, Bolshevik immigrants were allowed into the country leading to social and economic unrest in Palestine.

Shaw report 1930: It stated the reason that the investigation found that caused the outbreak of hostilities. The conclusion were:

1. The long series of incidents connected with the Wailing Wall... These must be regarded as a whole, but the incident among them which in our view contributed most to the outbreak was the Jewish demonstration at the Wailing Wall on 15 August 1929. Next in importance we put the activities of the [Society for the Protection of the Moslem Holy Places](#) and, in a lesser degree, of the [Pro-Wailing Wall Committee](#).
2. Excited and intemperate articles which appeared in some Arabic papers, in one Hebrew daily paper and in a Jewish weekly paper published in English.
3. Propaganda among the less-educated Arab people of a character calculated to incite them.
4. The enlargement of the Jewish Agency.
5. The inadequacy of the military forces and of the reliable police available.
6. The belief, due largely to a feeling of uncertainty as to policy, that the decisions of the Palestine Government could be influenced by political considerations.

Peel Commission of 1936: as the other reports it was to discover what was the reason of the uprising but in this case of the 1936 uprising. It is the first to recommend a two state solution. And it was clearly set to determine what changes were needed into the mandate. We will point out some of their findings:

- It established that the arguments made by the Arabs that the lands were somehow been taken away by the Jews were unfounded since the Arabs did not develop the lands neither had the capacity to do it. Before the lands were sold they were almost wasteland. The only thing that was true was that the increasing population, specially the increasing Jewish immigration was the source of the hatred.
- The British mandate over the area should eventually be abolished

- That there should be an exchange of population and land if the Partition worked out.

However the world scenario and the complicated political situation led the British government to declare the plan of this commission to be impossible. Furthermore the next commission worked through checking this last plan.

:

Woodhead Commission 1938: it comes to be because the Peel commission failed in the task of solving the revolt and also the 3 parts of the conflict rejected their recommendations. This commission was to examine the Peel plan and make an actual partition Plan. The commission established its plan, the partition will be a

- Jewish state that will be on the coast and will be given 1250km<sup>2</sup> in form of a strip
- The Arabs will be given the rest of central Palestine and a bit more to finally have a frontier with a line over the Dead Sea and Gaza
- The rest of the territory remained under British influence.

White paper of 1939: the Woodhead commission report was emitted at the same time violence began to intensify in Germany what led to the St James conference in London to try and give a final solution to the problem. This paper was approved by the British Parliament in May 1939. It had 3 parts

- Constitution: it established that the policy of the UK was not to create a Jewish State against the will of Arabs, because that will be against the will of the Arab majority, for that UK was going to create a single state where both Jews and Arabs could live and form a government where the interests and safeguards for both parties are a must
- Immigration: they established that immigration should not be restricted in the manner it doesn't hamper the economy and welfare of the Arab population. If so the immigration of Jewish people could be forbidden. And so for every 5 years there was a quota that the state will handle and it required the acquiescence of the Palestinian Arabs.
- Land: It established regulations for the selling of the lands and gave the High Commissioner for Palestine powers to do so.

The Jews and the Arabs rejected it, plus the League of Nations abstained of endorsing it. In some statements it is believed to be even contradictory with the initial British Mandate over the area, it could be implemented correctly because the Jews were being exterminated in Europe, so the Government made a statement that if a Jew could reach a neutral country then it could go to Palestine, this favored illegal migration. So towards 1947 the situation was out of control. This paper replaces the Balfour declaration

Third part

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 1946: in this case this committee aside from understanding the situation and trying to solve the immigration situation of the Jewish community but also understanding the situation of the Jews in Europe. Its conclusions were:

- That 100,000 Jewish refugees were taken to Palestine
- Palestine should remain a mandated territory
- The ban of purchasing land imposed over Jews should be rescinded.
- 3 principles for governance:
  - I. That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine.
  - II. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state.
  - III. That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths.
- Any Unilateral independence will result in civil strife.

Article 6 of the British Mandate:

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

# Treaties and Legal Stuff regarding UN

Friday, August 12, 2011  
12:36 AM

**Article 2.4:** All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. This article makes reference to article 1 (the purposes).

## **Article 4**

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

**Article 10 of the Charter:** The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

**Article 20:** The SC can call for special meetings of the GA through the SG or by a majority of the members of the organization, aside from its annual meetings.

**Article 39:** The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security

**Article 40:** In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures

**Article 41:** The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

## **Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

## **Article 43:**

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

**Article 106:** Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security

Palestine Commission of the GA: is an executive organ of the GA in charge of looking for solutions to the situation and the problem of the mandate.

Document **(S/P.V. 270) March 19 1948**: This report was submitted by the US, it was approved by China, France and US, the UK did not participate in the consultations, assisted into 2 meetings as Mandatory power, **the USSR rejected it**. The consultation was divided into 2 parts:

- Part 1: contained the information they had gathered. The Jews Accepted the plan but they will not modify it under any means, the Arabs Rejected it and stated they wanted just one state. It also stated that the parties, and the Commission considered that the plan impossible to be implemented in peaceful conditions thus the withdrawal of the mandatory forces will generate increased violence, due to its absence. It also noted that armed incursion were being made by land and sea. Even worse was the fact that if the mandate ended before a peaceful solution was settled then the situation could turn into a large scale fighting.
- The recommendations of the members: to take into consideration the infiltration of people by sea and land to take part of the fighting, and to call countries to not dot allow this, working to prevent such threats and the Council should work for the cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace and order

**UNSCOP 11+1 recommendations**: eleven of them were accepted by the UNSCOP unanimously and the last (12) by a substantive majority,

- That the Mandate should be terminated and Palestine granted independence at the earliest practicable date (recommendations I and II);
- That there should be a short transitional period preceding the granting of independence to Palestine during which the authority responsible for administering Palestine should be responsible to the United Nations (recommendations III and IV);
- That the sacred character of the Holy Places and the rights of religious communities in Palestine should be preserved and stipulations concerning them inserted in the constitution of any state or states to be created and that a system should be found for settling impartially any disputes involving religious rights (recommendation V);
- That the General Assembly should take steps to see that the problem of distressed European Jews should be dealt with as a matter of urgency so as to alleviate their plight and the Palestine problem (recommendation VI);
- That the constitution of the new state or states should be fundamentally democratic and should contain guarantees for the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and for the protection of minorities (recommendation VII);
- That the undertakings contained in the Charter whereby states are to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations should be incorporated in the constitutional provisions applying to Palestine (recommendation VIII);
- That the economic unity of Palestine should be preserved (recommendation IX);
- That states whose nationals had enjoyed in Palestine privileges and immunities of foreigners, including those formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, should be invited to renounce any rights pertaining to them (recommendation X);

- That the General Assembly should appeal to the peoples of Palestine to co-operate with the United Nations in its efforts to settle the situation there and exert every effort to put an end to acts of violence (recommendation XI).
- This one was accepted with 2 votes against of Uruguay and Guatemala and one abstaining  
"RECOMMENDATION XII. THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN GENERAL "It is recommended that  
"In the appraisal of the Palestine question, it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.

The Armistices ....

# What does exist and what does not

Tuesday, August 09, 2011

10:42 PM

## Exists:

- The Arab league
- Zionist Organization
- UN
- The first 3 Geneva Conventions
- International Refugee Organization
- First special session.
- UNSCOP
- United Nations Palestine Commission

## Does not Exist:

- Inverted veto
- The tribunals
- Peacebuilding commission
- The first peacekeeping mission.
- Uniting for Peace
- Res378GA
- Non aligned movement
- Nato
- Warsaw Pact
- 4th Geneva Convention
- General Armistice agreement
- UNHCR
- Universal Declaration on Human Rights
- Second special session

# Chapter XI - Non self Governing territories

Friday, August 12, 2011  
12:42 AM

In here we see that there is a difference between a trustee and a non-self governing territory. The first is administered by a Mandatory power and the last is administered by the UN. In this case we are talking about the first ones, the mandatory power must govern the region, as its own and must respect their rights and wishes, furthermore it must implement them if possible, under its sub paragraphs we have:

- Economical and social respect for their rights
- Help the territory to develop self government
- Further international peace and security
- Promote research and development
- Inform the SG about the progress with statistical information.

## Chapter XII - International Trusteeship system

Friday, August 12, 2011  
12:43 AM

These are territories under the rule of the UN, they are established under individual agreements that establish the region that will enter into administration, and the basic objectives are the same that non-self governing territories, but there is a special emphasis over the fact to develop autonomous governance. Territories that are candidate for trusteeship agreements are the ones that are under mandate, territories detached from enemy states of WWII and those that are voluntarily set under Trusteeship. An administrative authority is established in the agreement, that can be one country or many, or the UN itself. This agreement will not stop the country from its international obligations unless the agreement establishes it, and the suspension of the duties will be for the period of the agreement. Those territories not established as strategic in the agreement are to be directed by the GA through the Trusteeship Council

# Chapter XIII - The Trusteeship Council

Friday, August 12, 2011  
12:43 AM

It is composed by the P5, all of those members that have trust territories and other elected by the GA.  
Its functions and powers are:

## **Article 87**


1. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
2. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
3. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
4. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

## **Article 88**

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire  
each member has one vote.

# Structure 1946-1947


Friday, August 12, 2011  
4:26 PM



UN Presentation 485

# Structure 1947-1948

Friday, August 12, 2011  
5:02 PM



# Repertoire

Tuesday, September 20, 2011  
2:33 AM

Case 14 regarding Purposes and principles: the question rose during the resolution of may 29 were initially a halt to the immigration of men of military age, on the 307th meeting Israel invoked that such a measure will be contradictory to article 2.7 (respect to domestic policies internal affairs of a state) and thus the Council will be acting outside its jurisdiction. **Ukrainian SSR supported the point of view of Israel.**

Case 27 on Articles 51, 52 and 53: on the 296th, 297th and the 302nd meeting a series of questions rose regarding the joint action of the Arab states against Israel. the Arab High committee stated that they asked for help through article 51 and that they maintained the sovereignty of Palestine after the mandate ended. Syria stated that they had acted through the Arab League under article 52, but the USA stated that this was out of order since the regional enforcement had to be approved by the Council as stated in Article 53.

Case 8 of Article 39 and 40: when the council discusses the special report of February 24th, they had a problem in the consideration on the use of article 39, but that even if a threat existed the council could not use article 42, another thing to note was that if maintenance of public order could be addressed as a international security issue. **The USSR on the 260th meeting of March 2nd requested that the interpretation of this should be made through the direct consultations instead of a committee because it was too slow, other details regarding the committee can be found on the Situation section.**

Case 9 on Article 39 and 40: after the declaration of Independence of Israel the Council considered the use of Article 39, regarding the fact that if it was a real international security issue or not. The council rejected the use of the article. **From the 293rd to the 295th of may 18th meeting USSR and Ukraine stated that delaying the actions for the form of the questionnaire was useless, since the Council had enough information to determine the use of Chapter VII. To the point of view of both of the SSRs it was a clear that a threat to peace and a breach of peace existed with the information of the parties received by the Council. At the 295th meeting the USSR stated that the Truce commission was useless as they stated it will be from the beginning.**

Case 10 on Article 39 and 40: Here we can add that the **USSR stated that if any of the events of Article 39 was recognized by the council immediate action through articles 41 or 42 should be done, saying the threat exists and staying silent is useless. At that point however they regarded if the international conditions were enough to deploy any of the measures.**

Case 19 on Article 43: This situation rises from the actions and requests of the SG to deliver necessary staff to the Mediator for assistance if the completion of its tasks, according to the statement by the SG the resolution in the GA creating the mediator allowed the SG to give any staff whatsoever to the mediator for the assistance over its tasks. **The USSR representative in the 331st and 338th meeting of the council objected the request of the SG to deliver 50 military staff members recruited by the Secretariat to assist the mediator in the supervision of the truce, the argument of the USSR was that the SG could not deploy such a staff since the duties that were given to the staff recruited were related to international peace and security, the duties of the SC, so the USSR requested that the SG could just send staff of the secretariat to the mediator if it was for supporting roles, sentries and armed guards should remain under the scope of article 43 and in this particular case under article 106.**